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Corporations As Ships: An Inquiry Into
Personal Accountability and
Institutional Legitimacy*
Art Wolfe**
The changes thereby wrought in the lives of the workers, of the owners and
of the general public, are so fundamental and far-reaching as to lead... schol-
ars to compare the evolving 'corporate system' with the feudal system; and to
lead other men of insight and experience to assert that this 'master institution
of civilized life' is committing it to the rule of a plutocracy.... Such is the
Frankenstein Monster which states have created by their corporation laws.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly before first light, on Saturday, February 26, 1972, one-hun-
dred thirty million gallons of sludge and water burst from an earthen
dam and rampaged down Middle Fork Hollow, devastating most of
the sixteen small villages comprising the community known as Buf-
falo Creek, West Virginia.2 One hundred and twenty-five people,
mostly women and children, lost their lives in the thick muddy soup;
over 200 adults and 450 children survived, but were physically and
* I wish to thank John Bonsignore, Steve Dow, Tony McAdams, Charles
Perrow, and Bart Van Reekin for their time and patience in reading and commenting
on early drafts of this article.
** Art Wolfe received his B.A. in History from the Ohio State University in 1962,
his M.A. in Economics from the University of Illinois in 1963 and his J.D. from Ohio
State University Law School in 1968. Mr. Wolfe is a Professor of Business, Law &
Public Policy in the Eli Broad Graduate School of Management at Michigan State Uni-
versity. He developed the business ethics course at Michigan State with Professor Jim
Roper of the Department of Philosophy following his study in the Ethics Fellowship
Program at Yale University. He was a Visiting Professor with the Business & Public
Policy Group at the University of California, Berkeley in 1985-86 and held a similar
position at The Kellog School of Management at Northwestern University in 1989-90.
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1. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. Hereinafter the death and destruction that resulted will be referred to as "the
Buffalo Creek disaster".
emotionally scarred and sought compensation through the legal sys-
tem.3 A large energy conglomerate, Pittston Company, paid over $13
million (or about $10,000 per plaintiff) in settlement of the charges
brought by plaintiffs for the estates and the survivors. 4 No natural
person was held accountable for this death and destruction. In fact,
two years later Pittston's president at the time of the disaster was
promoted to Chairman of the Board.5
Over twelve years later, and half a world away in the Indian
Ocean, Electrician's Mate Fireman, Michael P. Smith, reported to
sick bay aboard the USS Davidson, a 250-man warship. The in-
dependent duty corpsman in the sickbay diagnosed him as having
bronchitis, and treated him with Tylenol and bed rest. Smith's condi-
tion worsened. The Navy flew him to an aircraft carrier and then to
a hospital in Freemantle, Australia, where he died nine days later of
respiratory distress syndrome, complicated by pneumonia and pneu-
mothorax.6 As a result of this death, the Navy court-martialed the
independent duty corpsman in the sick bay, the division officer, the
executive officer, and the commanding officer of the USS Davidson,
finding them to be in dereliction of duty. These men in positions of
responsibility were held accountable; they answered for the death of
Michael P. Smith which they had collectively caused.
This article will develop an explanation of why society tolerates
the results of the Buffalo Creek disaster. In our society today, exam-
ples of death and destruction by large business corporations abound;7
yet those in positions of authority in these massive hierarchies hardly
look askance at the destruction caused by their organizations. In the
3. Most of the facts in this section of the article about the Buffalo Creek disaster
are derived from a book written by Gerald Stern, the chief legal counsel for 625 plain-
tiffs who sued for damages resulting from the event. See G.M. STERN, THE BUFFALO
CREEK DISASTER (1976).
4. Id, at 274-303 (recounting the terms of the settlement).
5. WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1976, at 21, col. 2.
6. 112/8/1002 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROC. 31-34 (Aug, 1986) [hereinafter NA-
VAL INSTITUTE].
7. There are many semi-scholarly accounts of death and destruction other than
Stern's account of the legal aftermath of The Buffalo Creek disaster. However, I de-
cided to discuss this disaster because Stern was a practicing attorney with one of the
most prominent firms in the country, Arnold & Porter, in Washington, D.C., and be-
cause I believed his account to be honest, accurate and fair. In much of the book, he
quotes from testimony at government hearings, from government reports, depositions
and other reliable sources.
Other detailed accounts of foreseeable death and destruction are available. See, e.g.,
J. GODSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DC-10 (1975) (discussing the preventability and
lack of personal accountability for the deaths of 346 people in the largest single air dis-
aster). See also MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985); S. PERRY AND J. DAWSON, NIGHTMARE (1985); PAUL BRODEUR,
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1986); J. EGGINGTON,
THE POISONING OF MICHIGAN (1980); NICHOLAS ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE:
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES AND INJURY (1976); MCKINLEY C. OLSON, UNACCEPTABLE
RISK: THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1976).
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pages which follow I argue that the law as it is structured and applied
today is incapable of achieving a measure of human accountability
when, like Frankenstein, our business giants become monsters.8
This article was written to vindicate my intuition that we can have
a gentler, more humane business environment. The law that creates
and controls large business corporations is not immutable. The path
to a more humane business environment requires us to pay close at-
tention to how we are taught to think about law. If we do, we will
learn how our collective thoughts come to us from the ages past, per-
petuated in the name of education, science and "expertise," and how
these venerated, shared beliefs take on the noble aura of a verity and
thus become unquestioned. The ideas of eighteenth-century writers
who were responding to the events of their time led to much of to-
day's business-related public policy. The simple fact is, their reality
is not ours.
Society must overcome the tradition of unthinking human experi-
ence (particularly of the past one hundred years) to choose public
policies known to be in its best interests presently. To highlight the
role and force of tradition, I contrast the Buffalo Creek Disaster and
the USS Davidson incident. I then will dig beneath the surface of
current legal responses and public policy expressions to explain the
formal, legal response to each event. This article subsequently ar-
gues that in a world shaped by the large business corporation, the
path to a more humane social environment should be established by
resurrecting one of the most fundamental moral notions-that one
should have to answer for contributing to the death of another.
Specifically, I present my argument in four parts. Part I outlines
the events that caused the Buffalo Creek disaster. I conclude that if a
tribunal had found a natural person directly responsible for the col-
lapse of the dam, it would have convicted that person for manslaugh-
ter for the 125 deaths. What stands between this result and the
result of no human accountability is the fact that the dam was con-
structed and maintained by a business corporation. I then contrast
8. Throughout this paper, I will refer to the "large business corporation." My
thesis applies to the largest 1500 corporations, the shares of which are traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. This grouping is somewhat arbitrary. I believe it is neces-
sary, however, to separate those very large business corporations (capable of imposing
substantial risks on employees, the environment and others) from small, Mom & Pop
corporations. Other scholars have treated large corporations separately as an appropri-
ate grouping. See, e.g., P.I. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1975); A.F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE, 124-151 (1976); W. ADAMS AND
J.W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX (1986).
the disaster with the court-martial of the four men in the chain of
command aboard the USS Davidson in June, 1984. This contrast will
show that the response of the law to the Buffalo Creek disaster rests
on a history of haphazardly created legal assumptions and conven-
tions. These assumptions are grossly inaccurate, and thus palpably
inapplicable to a world of corporate giants that create substantial
risks to our health and welfare. The ill-formed public policy of today
produces results that run counter to the most fundamental beliefs of
the civilized world-the belief that one who uses his own property
for his own benefit and kills someone in that process, answers for
that death.
"Having to answer" to some authority greater than oneself is what
is meant by the verb "to account." 9 The officers and enlisted men of
the USS Davidson were accountable, while the management of Pitt-
ston and its subsidiary Buffalo Mining Company was not. It is this
fact, more than any other, which prompts this article.
Part II opines that society does not directly view complex, remote
social events such as the Buffalo Creek disaster, but views them indi-
rectly through a system of overlapping beliefs. This system may be
characterized as a kind of mental filter or lens: it enables us to see
and give meaning to objects and events far away. This lens has a pre-
scription-that is, a force in our society shapes it in a certain way or
grinds the lens to reflect certain facets of a perceived reality. The
force that shapes this social science lens is individualism. Individual-
ism, American individualism especially, is more than a philosophy; it
is a pervading view of how to live. It shapes individual lives, orders
society, and serves as the image which has created much of our public
policy.
The most powerful legal expression of American individualism oc-
curred in 1886, when the United States Supreme Court explained
that business corporations should be treated as persons for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'O It did so without discussion, with-
out debate, and without stated reason.11 Over the years, legal knowl-
edge and practice has accepted the view that business corporations
like individuals, can be held accountable. With the emergence of this
idea, human accountability for death lost its meaning and the idea of
natural-person accountability became hidden from view.12 This view
9. One of the earliest uses of the words "to account" appeared in 1340 in a con-
text where it meant "answering for conduct." THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Vol. I, 1971).
10. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
11. Id.
12. Human beings cause deaths, while corporations, legally artificial persons that
are orderly accumulations of assets, do not cause death. But, because we believe corpo-
rations to be persons, the humans responsible for death escape accountability. This
represents a substantial form of social power. Working one's will on others without
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should be resurrected. In order to enjoy a more tender humane busi-
ness environment, individual human accountability must be
reestablished.
In Part III I argue that belief systems ("lenses") can be changed.
Here, the emphasis shifts to the selection of a new shape for the lens
- a new way of believing and, thus, seeing the large American busi-
ness corporation. Society should view these fictional, legal entities as
merely an orderly accumulation of tangible and intangible property.
They comprise a system of potential energy; a body with mass, power
and inertia which is capable of enormous destruction.
Without human direction, however, this mass lacks purpose and
meaning. This reality appears in the USS Davidson case. Our Naval
tradition, inherited from England and dating back thousands of
years,' 3 recognizes the danger in controlling ships, and separates the
perception of the ship from the perception of a human controlling
the ship. It is the sailors and officers who give a ship its direction and
purpose, and it is they who are accountable for their actions or inac-
tions on the ship.
For purposes of achieving the view that human beings control cor-
porations, the large American business corporation should be seen
and understood as a ship. By viewing corporations as ships, society
may more clearly separate the human thought and action (or inac-
tion) that is the cause of good or evil from the rather inert accumula-
tion of property known as the business corporation. The common
belief that a large business corporation is a person is no more or less
legitimate than the belief that such institutions are ships.
The last part of this article calls upon one of the oldest ideas in
western legal tradition, and advances the argument that several
traditional precepts of trust law, as fashioned by centuries of equity
court experience, should apply to corporate management. That is, if
corporations are seen as ships, then what form should the obligations
of management take? I propose that managers of large business cor-
porations should be thought of as trustees, while the corporation (or
ship) should be seen as the body of the trust. In most trust arrange-
ments, a trust is created for a third party, the beneficiary. Two levels
being held accountable for death and destruction is a classic form of power, not dissim-
ilar to that developed by the Catholic Church before the Reformation. See Wolfe,
Power in the American Economy: A Review and Commentary, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 131
(1989).
13. See E.M. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR THE NAVY AND MARINE
CORPS 4-5 (1970); W.P. MACK, NAVAL CEREMONIES CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS (1980).
of beneficiaries exist in this model. Shareholders, employees, cus-
tomers, creditors, and suppliers are primary beneficiaries. Secondary
beneficiaries are those in close proximity to the corporation's actions,
as well as the local, 9tate, and federal governments.
These beneficiaries should be able to maintain an action against
corporate management for dereliction of duty. This is analogous to
the conclusion in the USS Davidson case: management is obligated to
be informed of the consequences of its action and inaction. When
such action or inaction results in risks to a beneficiary leading to
death and destruction, managers should be held in dereliction of duty
and removed from positions of authority. Hence, in the Buffalo
Creek disaster, Nicholas Camicia, the C.E.O. of Pittston, should not
have been promoted to Chairman of the Board following the death
and destruction caused by a "division" of that conglomerate. He
should have been held accountable and dismissed from his position of
authority.
Achieving this latter result is the core of this article. To do this, I
conclude that society must change basic beliefs upon which our law
and economics rest.
II. GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT TWO EVENTS
The Buffalo Creek disaster and the USS Davidson court-martial
following the death of Seaman Smith were the subject of public, for-
mal investigations. Consequently, the facts are undisputed. The fol-
lowing summaries are compiled from sworn testimony, official
reports, pleadings, and first-hand comments by those involved.
A. Buffalo Creek
The Buffalo Creek disaster occurred on February 26, 1972. At that
time, Buffalo Mining Company, a West Virginia corporation and one
of the largest employers in Logan County, West Virginia, was wholly
owned by Pittston Company, a large energy-related conglomerate
with corporate offices on Park Avenue in New York City.14 Pittston
owned interests in coal, oil, trucking firms, and the Brinks Armored
Car Company. It purchased Buffalo Mining for seven million dollars
in 1970, and added the company to its coal group.
The individuals in the corporate hierarchy who are important for
purposes of this article are: Steve Dasovich, Buffalo Mining Company
operations manager; Jack Kent, Buffalo Mining Company superin-
tendent of strip mining; Irvin Spotte, president of the Pittston Coal
Group; and Nicholas Camicia, president of Pittston Company.
Extracting coal from the ground, and cleaning and hauling it is an
14. G.M.STERN, supra note 3, at 11.
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extremely dangerous enterprise. The coal must be washed and
graded before it is marketed. A mine the size of Buffalo Creek must
dispose 800 to 1,000 tons of solids, and 400,000 to 500,000 gallons of
water containing another 500 tons of solids each day.'5 A natural dis-
posal site for this waste is the closest ravine. 16 Buffalo Mining
pumped the liquid discharge into Buffalo Creek itself, and dumped
the solids along the banks of the creek.17 The solid refuse soon
choked off the creek, forming an earthen dam across the creek bed.1s
When it became difficult to dump more refuse behind the earthen
dam, a new upstream site was selected and the process was
repeated.19
At the time of the disaster, there were three earthen dams. Dam 3,
the last dam and furthest upstream, began in 1968.20 It contained ap-
proximately 534,000 cubic yards of smoldering refuse, standing 60 feet
high, and stretching 450 to 600 feet across a hollow.2 ' It held back
over 100 million gallons of water, and stood 250 vertical feet above
the closest town of Saunders,22 but removed some distance up the
hollow. It was Dam 3 that triggered the failure of the other two
dams, and created a 20 to 30 foot wall of sludge that buried every-
thing in its path.23
Because the risk posed by this dam was substantial, the manage-
ment of Buffalo Mining Company and Pittston should have known of
it. These masses of earth slid down hollows with frightening regu-
larity. This was especially true if the mass was dumped in a hollow
with a flowing creek at the bottom. This was the case with the dams
built on Buffalo Creek. The following enumerated events should
have warned the management of Buffalo Mining and Pittston that
the risk of dam failure was substantial. Plaintiffs' counsel used these
facts to argue that Pittston should be liable for the damages resulting
from the dam's failure.
1. One of the first slides of earthen dams was in 1923 in Letcher
County, Kentucky, and was reported as the "largest .. .slide in the
15. Id at 29-30 (explaining the cleaning and grading process).
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id at 31.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id,
23. Id.
history of mining operations" in Kentucky.2 4 One year later, a slide
in southern West Virginia killed seven people, leading a local news-
paper to report it as, "[a] tragedy without parallel in the [m]ining
[alnnals of [s]outhern West Virginia."25 This disaster, which had
"striking similarities to the Buffalo Creek disaster,"26 resulted in a
law suit against the responsible coal company. 27 Recovery for the
deaths and property destruction was affirmed on appeal. 28 The court
stated, among other things, that "it seems clear that the piling of the
waste material so as to obstruct a natural watercourse, impounding
the water behind the obstruction, and allowing the waste pile to burn
for a number of years, constituted negligence." 29
2. In 1955, a corporation owned by Pittston, paid a $10,000 settlement
for damages from a dam failure.3 0 In 1966, six years before the Buf-
falo Creek disaster, a sludge slide in Aberfan Wales killed 144 people,
including 116 children between the ages of seven and ten.3 1 This dis-
aster attracted major news coverage.3 2 The U. S. Geological Survey
deputized an individual to study this disaster and visit the Buffalo
Mining operation, which at that time, had only its first dam across
the hollow.33 His report concluded that "Dam 1 was stable, but, 'sub-
ject to large washout on north side from overflow of lake.' "34 Imme-
diately after this report, Dam 1 overflowed prompting the
construction of Dam 2.35
3. In March, 1967, five months after the Wales disaster, a dam failed
at Pittston's Clinchfield Coal Company mine in Dola, West Virginia,
damaging one home and some land.
4. In 1968, a prescient resident of the town of Saunders, located be-
neath the Buffalo Creek dam, wrote to the governor of West Vir-
ginia, saying in part: The coal co. [sic] has dumped a big pile of slate
about 4 or 5 hundred feet high. The water behind it is about 400 feet
deep and it is like a river. It is endangering our homes & lives....
24. I& at 140.
25. Id.
26. Id at 59 (explaining that "a refuse pile which blocked a stream gave way dur-
ing the rainy season").
27. Id.
28. Id, at 60. See American Coal Co. v. DeWese, 30 F. 2d 349 (4th Cir. 1929).
29. American Coal, 30 F.2d at 51-52.
30. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 220.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id. at 62 (explaining that the disaster appeared on the front page of the Wash-
ington Post and New York Times, as well as mentioned in Time Life and on CBS
News).
33. Id. at 62-63.
34. Id. at 63.
35. Id.
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Please send someone here to see the water & see how dangerous it is.
Every time it rains it scares everyone to death. We are all afraid we
will be washed away and drowned.... Our lives are in danger.36The
letter brought state representatives to Buffalo Creek to meet Mr.
Dasovich.3 7 He agreed to build a new dam, Dam 3, further upstream
behind Dam 2.38
5. In 1970, a Pittston manager, Don Jones, was responsible for a cor-
porate memorandum that warned of proposed federal safety regula-
tions that would affect Buffalo Mining by forbidding "the closing off
of any stream or the impoundment of water by refuse-pile dams." 39
When the president of the Pittston Coal Group learned of the memo,
"he ordered him [Don Jones] to collect all the copies of the memo-
randum and not to send them out."40 Don Jones followed orders by
disposing of those envelopes he had addressed and by placing the
memorandum back in his files.4 '
6. In 1971, almost the entire downstream side of Dam 3 slumped for-
ward into the pool behind Dam 2.42 This was the third occurrence
which caused state inspectors to order Buffalo Mining to build an
emergency spillway for extra water.43 Steve Dasovich had ignored
each warning.44
7. There is little doubt that Mr. Dasovich knew that the dam violated
safety standards because Pittston's chief legal counsel admitted in a
deposition that prior to the disaster Dasovich had asked him about
"specific federal safety standards which prohibited the use of refuse
piles to impound water,"45 and which "prohibited the construction of
retaining dams not of substantial construction."46 Not only had Pitt-
ston and Buffalo Mining violated state and federal standards, but
ironically, it was revealed in a pre-trial deposition that Pittston's
managers were involved in drafting the very standards they had
36. Id at 159-60.
37. Id at 160.
38. Id
39. 1& at 188.
40. l
41. Id The memorandum remained in Mr. Jones' files until two days after the
Buffalo Creek disaster. I&
42. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 161.
43. 1& at 161-62.
44. Id. at 162.
45. Id at 167.
46. 1&
violated.47
8. Finally, even sources external to Pittston-Buffalo Mining knew of
the danger of the failed earthen dam. In the early 1970's the insur-
ance carriers asked coal companies to specifically identify earthen
dams that supported coal mining run-offs. Pittston did not identify
the three-stage dam on Buffalo Creek as a dam, but reported it as
" 'an impoundment,' 48 or "'embankment,' "49 or as a "'porous im-
poundment used as a water filtration system.' "50 These disguised
terms were probably used in order to avoid substantial increases in
premiums.51
Dam 3 failed after five days of heavy rain. The rain on Monday,
February 21, 1972, concerned Jack Kent, the superintendent of strip
mining, and led him to check the water level behind Dam 3.52 On
Wednesday, more rain continued to fall.53 On Thursday, Mr. Daso-
vich telephoned Mr. Spotte, President of the Coal group, stating that
he was "concerned that 'the water was rising in No. 3 impound-
ment.' 54 It continued to rain on Friday, and Mr. Kent found the
water had risen another eighteen inches.55 He checked the level
although Mr. Dasovich had asked him not to recheck the water be-
cause his own visit to the dam had proven (albeit erroneously) that
the water had receded.56
The residents of Saunders were quite edgy on Friday, February 25.
Several left their homes out of fear the dam would break, and sought
shelter for the night in a local schoolhouse.57 One resident even
called the sheriff's office at 3:30 a.m. on Saturday morning.58 She
wanted the National Guard to come to warn her neighbors since
older residents claimed that the dam would not last until daylight.59
After a series of phone calls, an agent of Buffalo Mining was
reached.60 At about 5:15 a.m., Mr. Dasovich was called and he ar-
rived at the dam at approximately 6:00 a.m.61 Dasovich saw the
47. Id at 170.
48. Id, at 144.
49. Id, at 166.
50. Id.
51. The intricacies of the money settlement among Pittston, Buffalo Mining and
their respective insurance carriers is not clear from the public materials available.
52. G.M.STERN, supra note 3, at 266.
53. Id
54. Id. at 267.
55. Id
56. I& at 267-68.
57. 1d. at 269.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 270.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 271. Prior to arriving at the dam, Mr. Dasovich enjoyed a leisurely cup
of coffee at a nearby coffee shop. Id,
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water almost over the top of the dam and ordered Mr. Kent to install
two twenty-four inch pipes to drain the water.62
Mr. Dasovich saw no danger in the situation. About one hour
before the mountain of sludge buried 125 people, he told the deputy
sheriff and the frightened people huddled together in the school-
house below Dam 3 that they did not "'have anything to be con-
cerned about.' "63 They did not know that Mr. Dasovich was not a
civil engineer and had little engineering knowledge; his position of
authority with Buffalo Mining and Pittston was sufficient for these
residents.64 A more formal report was made to the sheriff just thirty
minutes before the dam failed. The sheriff recalled Dasovich saying,
"'he had everything under control .. .that it was all right, that the
dam was all right.' "65 The dam failed about 7:00 a.m., February 26,
1972.m
The formal legal response to the Buffalo Creek disaster appears
substantial. At the state level: 1) The State of West Virginia ap-
pointed an Ad Hoc Commission to investigate the incident. It con-
cluded, "'[t]he Pittston Company, through its officials, has shown
flagrant disregard for the safety of residents of Buffalo Creek and
other persons who live near coal-refuse impoundments.' "67 2) A
grand jury was convened, but issued no indictments.68 According to
persons close to the proceedings, the grand jury believed that "it
would be capricious to fix all the responsibility on one man, Mr.
Dasovich."69 Thus, the grand jury could not indict any one individual
unless it could indict Pittston and all of its officers.
At the federal level, there was similar attention: 1) The U.S. Bu-
reau of Mines conducted a study of Dams 1, 2, and 3 which confirmed
"'that all three embankments were built by methods not in conform-
ance with current practices of the civil engineering profession in the
design and construction of water retention dams.'"70 2) The U.S.
Senate held hearings on the causes of the disaster and, among other
things, accepted a report from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on
62. Id, at 272.
63. Id.
64. Id,
65. Id, at 273.
66. Id
67. Id at 70.
68. Id. at 73. One of the largest obstacles to obtaining an indictment was piercing
the corporate veil. Id at 74.
69. Id
70. Id, at 139.
the disaster.71 It concluded that, from an engineering viewpoint, the
general idea and structure of Dam 3 was unacceptable, "it was
doomed to failure from the time the first load of refuse was
dumped."72 3) The most significant event following the disaster was
the filing of a lawsuit by Gerald Stern, a Harvard law graduate and
partner on leave from Arnold Porter, one of the largest and most
prestigious law firms in the country. He represented over 625 claim-
ants asking for a total of $64 million dollars.
Pittston's first official response to the disaster was to blame "heavy
rains'and rising flood waters."7 3 The company announced that "'the
break in the dam was caused by flooding - an Act of God.' "74 Cou-
pled with the "Act of God" defense was Pittston's strategy to force
survivors to bring their $64 million claim against only Buffalo Mining
Company.75 Pittston argued that even as sole owner of Buffalo Min-
ing, it enjoyed limited liability and could not be sued.76 Another
strategy of Pittston was to encourage its wholly-owned subsidiary to
settle quickly and spread the word that it paid claims fairly. In fact,
the first settlement, announced by Pittston with great public fanfare,
was $4,000 to a Pittston employee who had lost a six-room house.
Generally, the corporation paid about one-half of that claimed.77
A more serious defense tactic was to argue that no one was at fault
because "the embankment" had been constructed by experienced
coal miners in accordance with customary methods and techniques.78
This argument was made despite a federal court decision applying
West Virginia law79 to a case with "striking similarities" to Buffalo
Creek,80 in which custom and usage were found to be no defense to
an action where a refuse pile rushed down a mountain hollow and
buried seven people.8 ' The court explained that since every coal
company should be held liable if every coal company does something
wrong, a single coal company should not try to escape liability by
claiming other coal companies are equally careless.8 2
In a practical sense, Pittston's response to the law suit was to make
71. Id
72. Id (quoting Garth Fuguay of the Army Corp of Engineers).
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id, at 11.
75. Id at 14. Buffalo Mining Company was valued at $7 million, two years before
the accident. It was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pittston. Id.
76. Id. at 58.
77. Id.
78. Id at 59.
79. See American Coal Co. v. DeWese, 30 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1929). For a complete
discussion, see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
80. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 59.
81. American Coal, 30 F.2d at 351.
82. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 59 (outlining the reasoning of the district court
opinion).
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recovery as difficult as possible for the plaintiffs. For example, Pitt-
ston asked the court to schedule depositions for the plaintiffs in
Charleston, and then asked all 625 plaintiffs to undergo a physical
examination by the defense doctors in Williamston, Kentucky, 100
miles in the other direction.83 This was requested, despite the fact
that many plaintiffs were living in mobile homes and were without
transportation.8 4
In the process of taking depositions, Mr. Stern discovered that the
officers of Pittston believed they were untouchable. Mr. Stern asked
Mr. Camicia, the President of Pittston, who had asserted publicly
that the failed dam was built "in accordance with the normal and
customary practices in the building of such impoundments in the coal
fields,"85 whether he agreed with the United States Bureau of Mines'
comprehensive study of the disaster which reported that the embank-
ments did not conform with current practices of civil engineering.8 6
Mr. Camicia replied that "'[he was] not qualified to answer that be-
cause [he did not] know how it was built actually.' "87
Despite the apparent intransigence of Pittston management and
the uphill legal battle waged by Stern, Pittston and Stern agreed to
settle the $64 million claim for $13.5 million.88 Arnold & Porter put
in over 40,000 man-hours of work and earned $3 million for their ef-
forts.89 The plaintiffs, before the deduction for expenses, recovered
an average of about $13,000 each.90
B. Evaluation and Comment
The hearings and trial following the disaster at Buffalo Creek illus-
trate the formal response of our legal system. Can we not do better?
Better how? Better in the sense of realizing such legal response is
inadequate in preventing the recurrence of this type of disaster.
Compensation and prevention are two separate matters. It is doubt-
ful that even one plaintiff would have traded his quality of life before
the dam failure, and his loved ones or possessions for the amount of
money received from the law suit. In fact, after the settlement a sur-
vivor commented that, "'[t]he money can help us live an easier life
83. Id, at 119.
84. Id
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id. at 138-39.
87. Id at 139.
88. Id. at 298-99.
89. Id. at 302. Stern observed that "[slometimes you do well by doing good." Id,
90. Id, at 301 (emphasis added).
.. but it can never put our minds completely at ease, because noth-
ing but death can stop our minds from going back to that morn-
ing.' "91 Although Stern surmises that "[m]aybe the cost of our
settlement will make them a little more careful in the future,"92 the
amount of the money settlement is insufJtcient to have widespread
influence over the structure, incentives, practices, and perceptions of
the management of Pittston and similar large corporations.
Over three years after the event, ABC News reported that Pittston
had been assessed over $2 million in fines under the 1969 Coal Mine
Health and Safety Law, yet records showed that none of these fines
had been paid.93 More significantly, ABC reported that over eighteen
months after the disaster at Buffalo Creek, "'in hollow after hollow,
small towns and villages sit directly in the path of waters dammed up
by huge piles of coal slag dumped by neighboring coal operations.' "94
The Buffalo Creek disaster paints a vivid picture of our present
public policy. This is an excellent illustration of our legal system re-
sponse. Our public policy following a disaster is as follows: 1) a
flurry of public inquiry; 2) a law suit in which, ultimately, the alleged
wrongdoer acquiesces and is ordered to pay a form of compensation
to the damaged party; and 3) a possible tightening of state and fed-
eral standards and enforcement mechanisms. Despite this, the corpo-
rate hierarchy, its structure, personalities, patterns of conduct, in
short, the "organization," continues-an engine every bit as capable
of destruction as before the event. If a solitary individual had the
knowledge of Pittston/Buffalo Mining, and had the construction of
the dam been on behalf of an individual rather than a business corpo-
ration, the responsible individual would have been indicted for man-
slaughter for the 125 deaths. He or she would have answered for
failing to act in some additional manner besides merely paying
damages.
In recent years, scholars have seen organizational structure as a
major reason for disaster occurrences. Yale University sociologist,
Charles Perrow, in his major study on disasters such as Buffalo
Creek, notes that disasters may occur because of "[t]he role of organi-
zations and management in preventing [system] failures - or causing
them. Organizations [he argues] are at the center of our in-
quiry. . . ."95 Another widely-regarded sociologist, University of Chi-
cago's James Coleman, sees the structure of American society as
fundamentally altered because of the presence of large corporations
91. Id at 302.
92. Id.
93. Id at 191. The television special was entitled "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Coal." Id
94. Id.
95. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 10 (1984).
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and large governments, 96 and calls for a new source of knowledge
about them and their control. Noted Harvard economist, John Ken-
neth Galbraith argues that private sector organizations are the most
important source of power today.97 Indeed, accounting for one's own
actions is a measure of power. The classic definition of power focuses
on the ability of one to work his or her will on another. A less-devel-
oped notion of power was seen when the single most significant legal
actor in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia was not accountable in a mean-
ingful way for devastating that community. Why?
The law viewed the corporation as a person, and held it accounta-
ble for its actions to the extent that the corporation agreed to com-
pensate the victims. Thus, the focus was away from the part that
individuals played or could have played in this event. This is the par-
adox of our public policy. The law views Buffalo Mining and Pittston
as persons, yet if they were human, they would be in jail.
Understanding business corporations as real people is only a par-
tially useful metaphor. Real people own property, as do corporations.
Hence, it is the property similarity that legitimizes the use of the
metaphor. After a trial establishing liability, the court orders the
wrongdoer to transfer property to the victims. Human accountability
for death is buried from view and is out of reach. Is this result inevi-
table? No, our legal environment need not be structured in this man-
ner. Consider the following event.
C. The Death Of Seaman Smith
On June 23, 1984, U.S. Navy Seaman Electrician's Mate Fireman,
Michael P. Smith died in Freemantle, Western Australia.98 Nine
days earlier, he had reported to the sick bay of the USS Davidson,
complaining of cold-like symptoms. The independent duty corpsman
in charge of admissions at the sick bay diagnosed Smith's illness as
bronchitis. He treated him with decongestants, Tylenol, and ordered
bed rest. Over the next three days Smith's condition worsened, and
the diagnosis was changed to possible pneumonia. Five days after en-
tering sick bay, he was placed in bed, where he remained for the next
two days as his condition continued to deteriorate. On the seventh
day, he was flown to a nearby aircraft carrier, and two days later he
was tranferred to the intensive care unit of a hospital in Freemantle
96. JAmEs S. COLEMAN, THE AsYmMETPuc SocIETY (1982).
97. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER (1983).
98. NAVAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 31.
where he died. The cause of his death was adult respiratory distress
syndrome, complicated by pneumonia and pneumothorax.99
Those close to the event preliminarily responded that if Smith had
received proper treatment and been flown to the hospital in a timely
manner, he would have lived.l00 The formal response of the naval
legal system, following an investigation by a Judge Advocate General
Manual Investigating Officer, found the independent duty corpsman
derelict in the performance of his duty by failing to provide adequate
health care, which ultimately resulted in the sailor's death. After re-
views of this matter through the chain of command ending with
Commander of the Pacific Fleet, courts-martial were convened for
the chain of officers involved. The results of these individual court-
martials were characterized as follows:
Division Officer: "The facts of the investigation revealed a division officer who
failed to carry out his responsibilities toward the deceased who was a member
of his 13-man division. Not once during [the deceased's] illness did the divi-
sion officer visit the man .... 101
Executive Officer: "[The investigation revealed him] as being a disorganized,
inattentive individual who at no time during the illness checked up on the de-
ceased. He relied entirely on erroneous reports received from the independ-
ent duty corpsman and several casual personal sightings of [the
deceased] .... ,,102
Commanding Officer: The Commanding Officer's involvement was "inade-
quate;" moreover, the "detached monitoring by the chain of command falls far
short of the judicious attention to the welfare of command personnel" re-
quired by Navy regulations.' 0 3 The Commanding Officer was found guilty,
contrary to his pleas, of two counts of violations of Article 92 of the Uniform
* Cede of Military Justice1 04 for 1) failing to ensure the provision of adequate
medical care to the deceased, and 2) failing to adequately inventory, safeguard,
and deliver the personal effects to next of kin.1 0 5
D. Evaluation And Comment
All U.S. Naval officers are presumed to know appropriate chapters
of U.S. Navy Regulations. These regulations provide that Navy per-
sonnel are entitled to "adequate medical care," which is understood
to be "the best medical care available under the circumstances."'10 6
All of the officers concerned violated this standard because at least
one, and as many as five medical officers were within voice communi-
cation of the ship.'0 7 The deceased could have been taken to a ship
99. Id at 31.
100. Id. at 32.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. See 10 U.S.C. § 892(c) (West 1985) (noting that one who is in dereliction of duty
is subject to court-martial).
105. NAVAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 32.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id. at 34.
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with a medical officer within hours, when time could have made the
difference.
In short, the chain of command had a duty to act; it failed to act,
and this failure was a proximate cause of the death. The duty is
stated in general terms: "A commanding officer is generally account-
able for everything that happens on board his ship." 0 8 He must be
curious, and, in the words of the commander who presided over of
the court-martial of the Commanding Officer: "The commanding of-
ficer must get off the bridge and get about the ship." 09
III. A COMPARISON OF THE Two EVENTS
In this section I will compare the responses of the respective sys-
tems of law and policy to the two events described above. This com-
parison will raise questions which shape the issues I address in the
remaining pages of this article.
A. The Stark Contrast
In the Buffalo Creek disaster, 125 people died, over 600 people
were injured and entire communities were destroyed, yet no human
was held publicly accountable. The measure of accountability (if it
can be called that) was a large energy conglomerate, Pittston, and its
subsidiaries paying over $13 million in damages to the plaintiffs in a
civil law suit. In the case of the death of a single seaman, Michael
Smith, four U. S. Navy men, including three officers with no direct
contact with the deceased, were held accountable for their dereliction
of duty and removed from positions of authority.
I will not argue a wholesale adoption of the military model of jus-
tice used in the case of the death of Seaman Smith; however, the
irony exposed by the comparison of these results must be empha-
sized. Is it not strange that a military unit, the most systems-ori-
ented, impersonal, and allegedly inhumane of all organizational
types, holds accountable the entire chain of command for failing to
attend to a single, sick member? While, on the other hand, corporate
management who created substantial risks to their employees and
neighbors, and caused the deaths of 125 men, women, and children,
when those risks came to a horrifying, predictable conclusion, walked
away unscathed. In fact, the chief executive officer enjoyed a promo-
108. Id
109. Id
tion by the very organization that caused this destruction. 110
In the remaining pages of this article I explore the roots of this
irony and propose a more sensible solution.
B. The Causes
The causes of the deaths in these two events are many and com-
plex, but can be referred to in general terms as the failure of man-
agement to pay attention. That is, in each case, the wrongs are
similar and can be thought of as inattention to the consequences of
one's action within a complex social hierarchy. In neither case did
those in charge intend the consequences that flowed from their inat-
tention, yet both cases resulted in the deaths of unsuspecting, inno-
cent people.
What are the causes of their inattention? The answer probably lies
somewhere between simple laziness or stupidity, at one extreme, and
preoccupation with competing concerns, at the other extreme. In
large business corporations, the objectives of production and profit
compete for the attention of managers with other goals such as the
employee and risk minimization. Choosing between such opposing
objectives is a difficult task. Public policy should be directed toward
developing leaders who are aware of all of the consequences of their
actions, both inside and outside of the organization. Deaths resulting
from a manager's failure to be aware of risks imposed by an organiza-
tion should be viewed as an unacceptable form of leadership.
To rephrase the issues: the Buffalo Creek example is not a unique
set of circumstances. There are numerous examples in our system of
corporate hierarchy where a form of evil resulted from inattention
by those in authority."' The problem of inattention by those in au-
thority to the risks created to those possibly affected by corporate
management must be addressed.
C. Conventional Legal Remedies For An Event Such As Buffalo
Creek Are Inadequate To Confront The Problem Of
Inattention
The conventional legal remedies which have evolved to respond to
110. This incongruity is not trivial. To observers of the current American political
economy such incongruities are rich sources for insight into our society. Recently,
Tom Wolfe, author of The Bonfire of the Vanities, said he planned to return to non-
fiction writing because it is wilder, more unpredictable, and provides more fertile
ground for the creative mind than fiction. See THE STATE NEWS (East Lansing, Michi-
gan) Mar. 30, 1989, at 1.
111. For example, the inattention of Exxon management to the quality of its ship
captains indirectly caused the 1989 oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. See Bob
Connor & Eino Lehnton, Exxon Should Carry the Blame for the Oil Spill, NEWSDAY,
April 23, 1989, at 2.
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events such as Buffalo Creek are inadequate to address the problem
of inattention. As a result of the settlement payment of over $13 mil-
lion by Pittston, reason and logic dictate that management was aware
enough to ascertain other mining operations had stopped up other
creeks. This response is so minimal that it is almost meaningless. In
a case like Buffalo Creek, the civil law accomplishes one objective,
that of compensation. However, other results that might flow from
the payment of the settlement are speculative and matters of belief.
For example, it is often assumed that product liability judgments re-
sult in safer products. Such is not the case. A Rand Corporation
study on the impact of product liability judgments on product design
concludes, "[a]ll the firms viewed product liability litigation as essen-
tially a random influence, generating no clear signals as to how to ad-
just design behavior. The extreme version of this ... the two firms
with the largest volume of litigation took steps to insulate design de-
cisions from the influence of litigation." 112 In short, the current civil
remedies cannot be relied upon to bring about change within large
corporations because monetary judgments are not intended to bring
about structural change or otherwise affect the awareness of manage-
ment. Hence, they do not.
What is needed is a public policy which brings persons into posi-
tions of authority who are likely to be aware of the impact of their
actions and inactions. AWARENESS must be promoted, a general
type of awareness, that is a function of the type of person one is. Re-
quiring the firm to pay a money judgment to injured parties does not
address the problem of awareness by those in positions of authority.
The presently constituted civil remedy is analogous to asking every
sailor who was aboard the USS Davidson to pay a small, almost negli-
gible amount, and then asking the owners of the ship, the U.S. Gov-
ernment, to pay the balance to compensate the heirs of Seaman
Smith.
To alter the system of causes which lead to events such as Buffalo
Creek, we must change our thinking about present civil law. The re-
sult achieved by the civil law in such cases is fatuous in that it main-
tains the very same persons, the very same organizational structure,
the whole system of incentives, values, and objectives, together with
the general level of awareness that initially produced the catastro-
phe. The conventional civil law remedy that requires the business
corporations to pay the damage it caused is not wise or efficacious
112. G. EAADs & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RESPONSES
TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 107 (1983).
public policy. While the law provides some economic relief to the vic-
tims, it stops far short of the possibilities.
Nor is the application of criminal law any more efficacious in cir-
cumstances like the Buffalo Creek disaster. Why should it be? The
criminal law, like the civil law was fashioned in an age when the pri-
mary actors were individuals, and the purpose of the law was to pun-
ish the evil intent of the wrongdoer. The criminal law could be
adapted swiftly and applied with great clarity even when a single
human unintentionally caused death. Recently, former Olympic
diver Bruce Kimball was charged with a form of homicide when,
while driving under the influence of alcohol, he struck and killed two
teenagers in Florida."13 In a matter of months following the deaths,
he was sentenced to 17 years in the state prison."i 4 There was no in-
tentional wrong here, just a sorrowful action by a lone individual, re-
sulting in the deaths of two people. Justice, if it be called that, was
certain; accountability was achieved.
In the case of the large business corporation, however, the applica-
tion of the criminal law becomes very problematic."i 5 A corporation
has no mind and is therefore incapable of manifesting the intent re-
quired in the typical criminal prosecution. Moreover, when there is
no wrongful intent and horrible death results from mere inattention,
the current conceptions of criminal law are enormously frustrated.
The corporation can be fined if it violates a regulatory statute, but
this route leads to the same results as an application of civil law. The
people in authority who were unaware enough to cause the violation,
remain in authority. The criminal law has been applied to individu-
als within the corporation in only a few situations."i 6
The overall problem with applying criminal law to individuals
within a large, complex hierarchy is that no one individual should, in
all fairness, be held responsible for the actions of a collection of indi-
viduals. As the spokesperson for the grand jury said in the Buffalo
Creek case, "it would be capricious to fix all the responsibility on one
man, Mr. Dasovich."ii7
The stark fact is that people behave differently in groups than they
do individually.118 Mr. Dasovich may have been a very humane indi-
113. See Courts, WASHINGTON POST, March 31, 1989, at B2 (Fanfare).
114. Id,
115. For a thorough discussion of the application of the criminal law to Ford Motor
Corporation, see F. T. CULLEN, S. J. MAAKESTAD & G. CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME
UNDER ATTACK 145-309 (1987).
116. Id. at 325-337 (discussing the criminal prosecution in the Film recovery cases).
117. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 74.
118. See S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). The behavior of people
subject to the authority of others or the authority of group values was confirmed by
Milgram, but earlier writers, most notably LeBon and Freud, laid the theoretical
groundwork. See S. FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO
(1920).
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vidual, but he did not pay attention to the risks created by Buffalo
Mining. He stood on the dam just hours before it collapsed and was
so unaware of the risk, he believed that everything was "under con-
trol" and the "dam was all right."119 An effective public policy must
look to the mind of a person like Mr. Dasovich and ask what it was
perceiving and believing at a given time. Of course, this is impossible.
However, we can fairly judge that the incentives, corporate values
and patterns which caused him to see what he saw were not altered
by the public policy response which followed. Therefore, both the
civil and criminal sanctions failed.to address the important causes of
the Buffalo Creek disaster-the inattention of management to the se-
verity of risks it created.
D. Is The Status Quo Acceptable?
There are three related answers to this question. The first is that
the status quo may be acceptable if there are no reasonable alterna-
tives for handling the causes of events, such as the Buffalo Creek dis-
aster. However, it appears that there is a reasonable alternative,
which was illustrated by the legal system's response to the death of
Seaman Smith.120 There is no reason, other than the press of history,
to prevent society from adopting a more efficacious approach to this
problem. We can do better; therefore, we should do better.
Secondly, bound up as one are the vague, general assumptions of
what it means to be a human being, and the apparent legitimacy of
our current economic system resting as it does on institutional action.
To be human, to engage in a human enterprise involves awareness or
consciousness of one's actions.121 It also involves accountabillity if
one injures another through the use of one's property. To be ac-
countable means to answer in a personal sense to some authority,122
and being accountable is a substantial reason why systems of author-
ity appear to have legitimacy. If this were not so, human action, es-
pecially institutional action, would appear uncontrollable, and thus
arbitrary and even capricious. Events such as the Buffalo Creek dis-
aster, where there is no human accountability, diminish slightly, but
perceptively, the public faith required to maintain modern corporate
hierarchies. If there was no shared, public perception that large
119. G.M. STERN, supra note 3, at 273.
120. See ivifra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of what it means to be a responsible human, see CHRISTOPHER
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 113-15 (1976).
122. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 9 (2d ed. 1970).
business corporations served the public good, corporations would not
endure.123 "Serving the public good" partly means answering to
some superior authority-the law-in the name of the public.
If society does not establish a better system of public accountability
for corporate actions which cause death, then over a period of de-
cades an erosion of the public faith necessary to maintain these insti-
tutions will follow. There is a perception that life itself is cheapened
when group action is not accountable for the life it takes. The status
quo system in which money from an institution is exchanged for a
life seems to intensify this perception. This response threatens the
integrity and the legitimacy of the corporate system. Therefore, we
should act, in a public sense, while we can.
Lastly, the status quo leaves in tact all of the corporate values, be-
liefs and arrangements which caused the Buffalo Creek disaster.
This should illustrate that these arrangements create risks for each
of us every day. That is, the actions in the Buffalo Creek disaster
represented a very serious pattern of conduct, rather than an isolated
instance. It is substantial evidence of a pattern of institutional and
human arrangements which create risks which threaten everyone.
E. Arguments For Not Changing Our Public Policy To Establish
More Accountability
What legal arguments stand in the way of achieving the same ac-
countability illustrated in the USS Davidson case? The answer is
rather insignificant. Arguing that those in authority in a corporate
hierarchy should be removed if their inattention causes death vio-
lates no constitutional principles nor does it violate any well-rea-
soned, debated notions of public policy.1 24 As I argue, below, the
current public policy is reached through a fairly thoughtless, unex-
amined accumulation of court cases announced by the U.S. Supreme
Court without any reasoning that corporations were to be seen and
treated as individuals. This created the present circumstance where,
following a lengthy and costly court battle, corporations are held ac-
countable through the payment of money to victims.
The arguments opposing the suggested change in policy come most
forcefully from those directly impacted by the proposed change-cor-
porate managers. They argue that talented managers will no longer
seek positions of authority if they can be held accountable for inat-
tentiveness which results in death. There are two responses to this
argument. First, it appears that the U.S. Navy does not lack talented
123. The time span I have in mind is one of decades. If public accountability disap-
pears for a period of 20 or 30 years, this will be long enough to erode the bed of faith
the public has in the system.
124. The public debate on abortion, for example, presents fairly well-reasoned ar-
guments on both sides.
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officers desiring to be commanding officers of ships. Second, those
presently in authority assert that, if they were held accountable for
the risks they created, then some of the current risks might not be
present (with, of course, the perceived attending benefits). The re-
sponse to this position is that, if no one is accountable for a risk, then
the benefits of the risk and the risk itself are unnecessary. This
means that corporations will take fewer risks, resulting in less death
and destruction, and fewer benefits.125
The arguments against changing the present policy are minimal.
Law is a very human institution which is why it is possible to have a
humane environment through law. Law is not remote, it lives in us
and can be changed. John Noonan makes an eloquent point:
No person itself, the law lives in persons. Rules of law are formed by human
beings and applied by human beings to human beings. The human beings are
persons. The rules are communications uttered, comprehended, and re-
sponded to by persons. They affect attitude and conduct as communications
uttered from persons to persons. They exist as rules-not as words on paper-
in the minds of persons.
1 2 6
F. What Are The Obstacles to Change?
In a sense, our law works the opposite of how it should work. As
hierarchy expands, physically and emotionally removing managers
from the impact of their decisions, their personal accountability actu-
ally decreases.127 There is little logic or reason to this outcome. We
tolerate it, however, because it appears to be the natural result of the
historical evolution of public affairs. The status quo, the conven-
tional view of social and economic matters, develops a logic of its
own. At first, only intuitively-appealing arguments exist. Then a
125. Calculating the costs and benefits of the automobile to society, for example,
could lead to more extensive public transportation and safer means of transportation.
126. JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 4 (1976).
127. A severe problem in assessing accountability in any hierarchy appears. While
our civil and criminal law have evolved to allow corporate management to escape ac-
countability in events like the Buffalo Creek disaster, the same result occurs for top
government officials who often escape accountability for their negligent acts. For ex-
ample, the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 401, 60 Stat. 842, 842-47 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., including sections 1291, 1346, 1402, and
1504 (West 1988 and Supp. 1991), would impose liability on the federal government for
the negligent operation of a mail truck. The operator would also be personally liable
through conventional notions of civil law. If an American president were negligent,
neither the federal government nor the president could be held liable. See Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (where the federal government was not liable for the
deaths of 560 people). Good faith action also shields state officials from individual ac-
countability. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1973). Thus, the larger the hierar-
chy, the less the chances for establishing personal accountability.
rhetorical mode, complete with a formal vocabulary and a pervasive
logic and vocabulary, becomes institutionalized in the coursework of
our major educational institutions, thereby becoming part of the col-
lective consciousness. Out of this collective consciousness, our public
policy is constructed.
How does such public policy change? In general, our public policy
is based on a set of public, shared beliefs about how to arrange mat-
ters and institutions. As John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out some
years ago, shared beliefs or "conventional wisdom" is not challenged
by academic arguments in favor of change, but by the march of
events. 128 An event will come that challenges the public conscious-
ness and exposes how traditional theories have become palpably in-
applicable. One such an event was the disaster at Buffalo Creek.
Events are the agents of change; publicly held and shared beliefs are
the obstacles to change.
It is reported that in 1610, Galileo discovered new heavenly bodies.
A learned professor at the University of Padua revealed, literally,
how blinding the beliefs of the scientific community had become and
denied the existence of what was seen through Galileo's telescope,
reasoning:
We know that there are seven planets and only seven, because there are seven
openings in the human head to let in the light and air: two eyes, two ears, two
nostrils, and a mouth.... Besides, the stars are invisible to the naked eye;
therefore they do not influence human events; therefore they are useless;
therefore they do not exist.1 9
This reasoning is as ludicrous as the reasoning behind current public
policy, illustrated in the Buffalo Creek case. The biggest obstacle to
change is our beliefs about how our legal system should operate, cou-
pled with our fear of the unknown. We must realize that where we
are today is a result of the conditioning of unthinking human experi-
ence. This experience is lodged in our collective minds as a set of be-
liefs supporting apparently immutable rules. However, beliefs can
change, and rules are not immutable.
IV. THE CAPITALIST PARADIGM, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE
FORMULATION OF OUR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. How We View And Understand Remote Social Events
In this part of the article I trace the development of civil law as
applied to business corporations. I conclude that Americans' abiding
belief in individualism has so shaped their beliefs about public policy
that massive hierarchies of human beings are viewed as single per-
128. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLuENT SOCIETY 11 (4th ed. 1984).
129. W. ADAMs & J. BROCK, THE BIGNESS CoMPLEx at xiii (1986) (citing F. H.
KNIGHT, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACTION 57 (1960)).
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sons, consequently hiding human accountability. How did this come
about?
The explanation began innocently enough in 1886, when the U.S.
Supreme Court held, in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
that business corporations were to be considered persons who were
entitled to receive the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.130
What justifies the law to view corporations as persons?131 Corpora-
tions are not, in fact, persons.
A more accurate assessment of the nature of a corporation was
stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward:132 "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangi-
ble, and existing only in contemplation of law."'1 33 But, the popular
and accepted view is that corporations are persons. Why has the law
sought to view the American business corporation in a human image
when more suitable, educationally informative alternatives were and
are available?
The proposition that corporations should be treated, interpreted,
and comprehended as persons has been accepted as intuitively obvi-
ous and has not been the subject of analysis. There is no better evi-
dence for this proposition than the words of Chief Justice Waite who,
before argument and decision in Santa Clara County, announced:
"The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution....
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does."134
This famous pronouncement was made by one of the most signifi-
cant public policy institutions in our government without conscious
thought or debate. This significant association of corporations with
humans has not gone unnoticed. In 1949, Justice Douglas said in a
dissent:
It has been implicit in all of our decisions since 1886 that a corporation is a
"person" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
130. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
131. Professor Alfred F. Conard, examined numerous images of the corporation
and concluded,
All these views have validity, and all are useful in deciding some questions
which corporations present to the legal system. They do not, however, cast
great light on the more routine questions of how corporations should be fitted
into a juridical order whose sentences speak of individual human beings. For
these questions, the most important fact about corporations is that they are
composed of people.
ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 441 (1976).
132. 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (4 Wheat).
133. Id. at 636.
134. Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 396.
teenth Amendment... . The Court was cryptic in its decision [in Santa
Clara]. It was so sure of its ground that it wrote no opinion on the point....
There was no history, logic, or reason given to support that view. Nor was the
result so obvious that exposition was unnecessary.1 3 5
Why was the United States Supreme Court so thoughtless about
making this metaphor such a significant part of our public policy? 36
What lies beneath this surface of the Court's action here? The an-
swer lies in the way we come to know what we know. That is, the
answer is essentially epistemological. I will now turn to an explana-
tion of how public policy is formed, and develop the argument that
the shared belief system we call capitalism is founded on the assump-
tion that all significant economic action in the private sector is to be
viewed as natural, individual actions.
1. The Conventional Wisdom, Public Images And Ideology
This part of the discussion is based on a key idea from one of John
Kenneth Galbraith's best-selling books. He asserts that "[t]he first
requirement for an understanding of contemporary economic and so-
cial life is a clear view of the relation between events and the ideas
which interpret them."' 37 Galbraith suggests that between an ob-
server and some remote event such as the Buffalo Creek disaster, for
example, there is an arrangement of ideas-the conventional wisdom,
that serves as a mental lens through which we see and interpret the
event.
Galbraith maintains that conventional wisdom associates what is
desirable in a social policy sense with what is acceptable and familiar.
American notions of what is economically and legally desirable are
organized around and based upon what the entire community finds
acceptable and convenient.138 We approve of and promote that which
is the familiar.
This publicly-oriented epistemological scheme is affirmed by other
writers. Some thirty years ago, Kenneth Boulding, one of this coun-
try's greatest social scientists, argued that as we proceed from very
simple observations to more complex levels of generalization, such as
what should be done about the Buffalo Creek disaster, the concept of
the image becomes increasingly important.'3 9 The image of realityis
a theoretical model of not only how an observed phenomenon should
135. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
136. A few cases expressly held that for purposes of applying the constitutional
doctrine, corporations are not persons. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
382-386 (1911) (denying corporations the privilege against self-incrimination); Califor-
nia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974) (finding that corporations should
not be accorded the same privacy rights as individuals).
137. GALBRAITH, supra note 12B, at 6.
138. Id
139. KENNETH BOULDING, THE IMAGE 64 (1956).
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work, but how, in fact, it does work. More importantly, he asserted
that group action and societies are possible due to the existence of
shared public images, the common visions of most people. 140
Boulding wrote that there is a "stock of public images" in a society
established from "transcripts" which are permanent records of how a
group should act and see.141 These transcripts are created over gen-
erations by an educational system tempered by experience. 142 Fi-
nally, Boulding argued that the major institutions of society derive
their power from this stock of public images.143 Ironically, he also ar-
gued, that the most successful of these public images becomes the
most dangerous. 144 Both ceremonial and coercive organizations insti-
tutionalize their public image: "it acquires thereby a spurious stabil-
ity. As the world (and the organization) move on, the image does
not."145
Boulding's writings on the significance of images, especially his
conception of the public image, and Galbraith's "conventional wis-
dom" have remarkable similarities. They both conceptualize an ap-
proach to understanding public policy. Both public images and
conventional wisdom are created by history, are shared by most
members of society and are very resistant to change. However vague,
they are the key elements to understanding the more abstract phe-
nomena in our social life.
In 1975, Harvard Business School Professor, George C. Lodge de-
voted most of his book, The New American Ideology, to America's
shared belief system under the rubric of "ideology." He defined an
ideology as a collection of ideas that makes explicit the nature of the
good community. 146 But, he argued that ideology is more than this; it
is the theoretical framework by which a community defines and ap-
plies values, such as self-respect, fulfillment, and justice. No commu-
nity can be without an ideology because the ideology defines the
community. At any one time, some parts of the ideology may be
sharp and clear, and other parts obscure; some elements may be con-
140. Id
141. Id at 68-70.
142. Id
143. For further development of this argument, see ifra notes 191-194 and accom-
panying text.
144. BOULDING, supra note 139, at 79.
145. I My arguments demonstrate his point. The public image of corporations as
persons was created in the 19th Century. While the image holds fast, the corporation
has become vastly more powerful than most individuals and in ways not dreamed of in
the mid-to-late 19th Century.
146. GEORGE C. LODGE, THE NEW AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 7 (1975).
scious, and others unconscious or implicit.147 Lodge's point confirms
the thesis of this article: viewing corporations as persons is an ob-
scure, though very important element in our ideology.
Lodge does acknowledge the vital place of the natural person in
our society,148 but misses the point by saying that the large American
business corporation has no place in the older ideology. He does not
focus on the legal "fact" that corporations are persons. Rather he
sees corporations as beyond the conventional wisdom, the set of pub-
lic images, our ideology, and our lens. Thus, he believes corporations
lack legitimacy.149 Lodge concludes that the large American corpora-
tion is a sort of "collective, floating in philosophic limbo, dangerously
vulnerable to the charge of illegitimacy and to the charge that it is
not subject to control in the best interests of society."'150 Lodge over-
comes the pejorative connotation that the studies of ideology took on
at the hands of the Marxists. His purpose was to direct scholarly and
popular thought to American ideology and to the reality that it, like
Galbraith's conventional wisdom, is at the heart of understanding
why this country allows certain policies. Thus, Lodge correctly sug-
gests that the rich literature on the place and function of ideology in
a society is applicable to understanding our business environment,151
and our public policy foundation.
2. The Capitalist Paradigm
Galbraith, Boulding and Lodge all argue that we do not view re-
mote complex social events directly. Rather, we view such events
through a kind of social-psychological lens of meaning and value that
renders remote events comprehensible. Thomas Kuhn, a science his-
147. For a clear summary of Lodge's theses, see Lodge, Managerial Implications of
Ideological Change, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 79-105 (Clarence Walton
ed., 1977).
148. LODGE, supra note 146, at 9.
149. The difference between Lodge's view and mine may be minor. He sees the
large American business corporation as beyond the stock of public images that com-
pose our ideology. I believe it is within the stock but buried from view-hiding behind
the image of a natural, individual actor.
150. LODGE, supra note 146, at 18.
151. Although beyond the scope of this paper, I wish to acknowledge that the con-
siderable body of scholarly literature on ideology and its place and form in any society
are applicable to the creation and maintenance of the lens through which we view re-
mote events. See generally KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (Louis Wirth et
al. trans., 1968); KARL MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION
(1940); J. PLAMENATZ, IDEOLOGY (1970). Additionally, classics by Hegel and Marx and
their progeny are helpful.
Modern writing in ideology seems to contain a more pronounced political science fo-
cus. See, e.g., W. CONNOLLY, POLrICAL SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY (1967); R. LOVE, POUT.
ICAL IDEOLOGY (1962); P. CoRBETr, IDEOLOGIES (1965); M. MANN, CONSCIOUSNESS AND
ACTION AMONG THE WESTERN WORKING CLAsS (1973). See also Seider, American Big
Business Ideology: A Content Analysis of Executive Speeches, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 802
(1974) (which provides a less comprehensive and more concise framework).
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tory scholar arguably offers the best known work in this area. After
years of studying how physical science grows, expands, or changes, he
concluded that all sciences are collections of beliefs,152 not unlike the
social-psychological lens which conceivably represents the views of
Galbraith, Boulding, and Lodge. Granted, the physical sciences have
a great capacity to achieve concrete results (the landing of person on
the moon, for example), but they change, grow, and are established
in much the same way that social sciences grow. Kuhn refers to his
system of shared beliefs as a "paradigm" with two different mean-
ings. He writes that:
On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, tech-
niques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the
other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as
a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.1 5 3
In the first sense, a paradigm is the set of beliefs and values that
the members of a scientific community (or any community) share.
Conversely, the paradigm defines a scientific community. This set of
beliefs makes possible research, communication, and ultimately, a
measure of understanding about complex phenomena. It is needed
because when an individual scientist takes a paradigm for granted, he
or she need no longer attempt to build the field anew, starting from
first principles and justifying the use of each.154 A paradigm in this
sense is similar to the conventional wisdom, or a stock of shared
images, or an ideology. It is, simply, a way of believing that makes
communication (especially among scholars) possible.
Kuhn is cited because of his development of the second facet of a
paradigm. He admits that this is one of his major contributions.155 In
this second sense, a paradigm is a shared model or exemplar, usually
in the form of a puzzle or set of puzzles with proper solutions. It is
the conception of puzzles and proper solutions which, more than for-
mal statements of belief, guide scientists in their work. 56 For exam-
ple, chemists create and maintain their discipline through a set of
puzzles and solutions about how the physical elements relate. Simi-
152. THoMAs KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1976).
153. Id. at 175.
154. Id at 19.
155. Id. at 187.
156. Kuhn's work is not without criticism. See, e.g., Masterman, The Nature of a
Paradigm, GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (1978); Shapere, The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions, PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 383-94 (1964). Shapere's article is also cited by Kuhn
in his postscript. See KUHN, supra note 152, at 174.
larly, economists, accountants, and professors of management "sci-
ence" establish and perpetuate their discipline in this manner.
It is thus quite legitimate to speak of a "capitalist" paradigm. The
capitalist paradigm refers to the fundamental beliefs shared by teach-
ers, scholars, public policy commentators, politicians, and others who
speak and write about capitalism. While these beliefs are occasionally
clearly expressed, most often they are not. The beliefs include: the
central place of private property in the economy; the legitimacy of
profit as a return for risking private property in a public venture; and
the efficacy of profit for measuring both the efficiency and the utility
of the use of private property. The capitalist paradigm also includes
beliefs about the proper role of government in the system of private
property, and the dominant view that the objective of the entire
scheme of private property exchanges is to maximize the public wel-
fare by enhancing freedom of individual choice and expression.
The capitalist paradigm is taught in business schools and colleges,
and to a lesser extent in the public schools, as a science with each
business discipline such as economics, accounting, marketing, busi-
ness law, and management teaching students to derive the proper an-
swers to the puzzles which define that particular "discipline." At the
Ph.D. level, one is admitted to the paradigm when he or she can suc-
cessfully solve the puzzles proffered. Even at this level, there is little
discussion of the beliefs that give meaning to the puzzles. These core
beliefs are accepted on their face and pass for a measure of truth.
Although Kuhn did not write of social sciences, his point applies to
the teaching of law to illustrate that the legal paradigm is both the
set of beliefs about what law is, and the way we write and communi-
cate and teach about law. Hence, law is communicating through law
journals by means of articles constructed in a particular way, using
an agreed upon source to guide the reader, and in its more substan-
tive elements, focusing on reported appellate cases. The characteris-
tic that makes legal scholars "legal scholars" is the ability to study,
write about and apply law in the same way. The current legal para-
digm governs the types of questions that can be asked (the puzzle
formulation), as well as the kinds of answers that are permissible.157
At the heart of the creation and perpetuation of a paradigm is the
textbook. Kuhn believes that textbooks establish paradigms and are
the single most important source or authority in creating a scientific
community.158
In summary, three business and public policy scholars, plus science
157. Since this article asks non-standard questions, most legal practitioners and
scholars would not regard it as a "legal" article. Since it does not comply with the ac-
cepted and familiar way of formulating legal problems, they might assert that it is of
little value.
158. KUHN, supra note 152, at 143.
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scholar Thomas Kuhn have reached similar conclusions as how to
recognize and respond to remote social events like the Buffalo Creek
disaster. These events are viewed through a complex set of ideas, a
mental lens, shaped by traditions and images of expectations and
value. Textbooks, puzzles, and solutions play a substantial part in
shaping this lens. If this is the form or structure of the process by
which we learn about remote social events such as Buffalo Creek,
what is the substance? Looking at the lens itself, what is its shape?
If we could look into the lens, what would we find?
B. What We See In Remote Social Events Involving Business
Corporations: Individual Action
No significant intellectual force shapes our public policy more than
the belief about the nature and purpose of humankind. This collec-
tion of beliefs about the ultimate meaning of life is an intellectual
force embodied in one word, individualism. Individualism denotes
the expressed ethos of the American people. It is the prevalent tone
and sentiment forming our national character. It would distort the
proportions of this article to write about all of the facets of individu-
alism, and their subsequent, embodiment in our personal and institu-
tional objectives.' 5 9 Such attempt would amount to an intellectual
and popular history of the last four hundred years. Instead, the con-
tributions of a few of the most important writers will be sketched in
order to form a reasonable presentation of why remote social events
involving business corporations are viewed as a display of individual
action.
Modern American individualism had its roots in the demise of the
Middle Ages and the beginnings of the religious revolution of the
Reformation.160 At the center of the beliefs creating this pervasive
religious movement in Northern Europe was the idea that an individ-
ual believer does not need intermediaries, that worshipers would
reach their own relationship with their own God in their own way
and through their own effort. This social revolution was pervasive
and influenced life beyond traditional worship in churches. Scholar
Sacvan Bercovitch stated:
The tradition of humanist personal literature, extending from the fourteenth,
through the seventeenth centuries ... is concerned exclusively with the au-
159. For a discussion of eleven separate divisions of "individualism," which includes
the religious, political and epistemolgical facets, see 2 DICTIONARY OF IDEAS 594 (C.
Scribner's Sons ed., 1973).
160. See R.N. BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 142-63 (1985).
tonomous secular self. Leaving the questions of sainthood to theologians, each
of these writers declares the primacy of the single separate person, and justi-
fies his self-study on its intrinsic merits, without pretense at religious or even
moral instruction. He assumes that what he has thought and done will inter-
est others because it is authentically his, the product of his own personality in
all its rich uniqueness. 1 6 1
In a standard scholarly work on Protestantism, the religious by-
product of the Reformation, editor J. Leslie Dunstan, wrote:
The transition from the medieval to the modern age came about through [1 an
action of man's spirit. Man took control of life; he saw himself as a person in
his own right, he grew aware of the mastery over life that was possible for
him, and he began to live by his own inner power. The modern age began not
with some event which can be dated specifically, but within the spirits of men,
as men became self-conscious and alive as persons.1 62
Religious dogma as such did not disappear. However, a substantial
change was the development of the view of man as independent from
the institution of the established Catholic church. Man was at once
free of the influence of the church, but dependent upon God's ex-
pressed wishes in the Bible. Since God did not exist in or through
the church, each person had the potential to realize God directly.
This was concisely expressed by Martin Luther who admonished, "I
first lay down these two propositions, concerning spiritual liberty and
servitude: A Christian man is the most free lord of all, and subject to
none; a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and subject
to everyone."'163
Directly challenging the authority of the Church, Luther wrote
and preached that each man has the individual capacity to becone
the vehicle to experience God:
If a little company of pious Christian laymen were taken prisoners and carried
away to a desert, and had not among them a priest consecrated by a bishop,
and were there to agree to elect one of them ... and were to order him to
baptize, to celebrate the mass, to absolve and to preach; this man would as
truly be a priest as if all the bishops and all the Popes had consecrated
him.1 64
Martin Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564) helped to
institutionalize in religious writing the separateness of man from his
spiritual institutions. Calvin, writing on the nature of man, urged his
readers and listeners to know themselves first:
There is much reason in the old adage which so strongly recommends to man
the knowledge of himself. For if it be thought disgraceful to be ignorant of
whatever relates to the conduct of human life, ignorance of ourselves is much
more shameful, which causes us .. , to grope our way in miserable obscurity,
or even in total darkness.16 5
The enhanced view of the primacy of the individual, espoused by
161. SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE PURITAN ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 11-12
(1975) (emphasis in original).
162. PROTESTANTISM 19 (J.L. Dunston ed., 1962).
163. Id, at 41.
164. 1d at 48.
165. Id. at 57.
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the writers of the Reformation, found support in the writings of phi-
losophers in Northern Europe and England. Rene' Descartes (1596-
1650) whose famous pronouncement, "Cogito Ergo Sum" (I am think-
ing, therefore I exist), joined the chorus of those chanting the refrain
of the primacy of the individual, and emphasized the powers of rea-
son inherent in the nature of humanity. In 1690, John Locke (1632-
1704) reasoned that each person possesses oneself absolutely.166
Therefore, that which one man mixes with his labor becomes his. 6 7
Thus, Locke based his argument for the existence of modern "private
property" on his enhanced view of the autonomous individual in na-
ture, reaching into his environment and converting everything he la-
bored on to his use. The impact of Locke's ideas on Thomas
Jefferson and the authors of our Constitution is established beyond
question, but is mentioned here to acknowledge that individualism
was becoming institutionalized in this country during that time.
The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) also contrib-
uted substantially to the development of American individualism.
Rousseau saw a fundamental antipathy between eighteenth-century
French society and the nature of man. He saw society, especially the
"High Society" of the Bourbon dynasty, as working at cross purposes
to the fundamental nature of the need of all human beings. He be-
lieved man was endowed with free will and subject to perfectibility if
he only pursued his own natural instincts. Where could this be per-
formed in its purest form? In the colonies of the "New World,"
where man was engaged in the very real pursuit of carving out an
existence from the forests and mountains of a rugged, primeval land.
Last of the European philosophers, chronologically, but first in
terms of enduring influence on American individualism, is Adam
Smith (1723-1790), the Scottish moral philosopher whose The Theory
of Moral Sentiments and An Inquiry into the Nature of Causes of the
Wealth of Nations emphasized the core idea that serving the general
welfare was the purpose of social arrangements and government.
The most desirable way to achieve the best for each individual was to
permit persons to act on their own impulses in pursuit of their own
interests. Smith argued that each person, if left alone to trade for his
own gain, would be led by an invisible hand to promote the general
166. See JOHN LocKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689); JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (1690).
167. Id.
welfare.168 Thus the proper function of government was to promote
the free exchange of goods between individuals, and it could best ac-
complish this by staying out of the way.
The religious writers who formed the basis of the Puritan move-
ment that settled the colonies in and around Massachusetts in the
early 17th century transformed the European and English ideas of
the autonomous individual into the expressed essence of the Ameri-
can experience. Early American literature established the Puritan
vision that settlers in this new land were modern day Israelites.169
Thus, expelled from their homeland, they summoned their individual
strength and, pursuing the word of God, triumphed over the crude
American environment. On the impact of the Puritan view of life,
Professor Bercovitch concludes that:
The New England Puritans gave America the status of visible sainthood. The
subsequent impact of their concept cannot be overestimated. Whatever the
extent of its influence, it contributes significantly to the link between the
New England and the American Way, to the usurpation of American identify
by the United States, and to the anthropomorphic nationalism that character-
izes our literature.... American dream, manifest destiny, redeemer nation,
and, fundamentally, the American self as representative of universal
rebirth.170
The religious and political writers in the mid-to-late eighteenth
century advanced a set of universal claims for Americans that re-
ferred to the actual or imminent realization of the final stage of re-
corded human progress. This final stage was to be based upon a new
form of empire in which individual self-development, individual free-
dom and dignity were to reign.
Visiting this new land in the early 1830's, the Frenchman, Alexis
deTocqueville was the first to use the word "individualism" to refer
to the American spirit. In Democracy in America, he said that
American individualism is a calm and considered feeling which dis-
poses each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and
withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society
formed to suit his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look
after itself.171
A few years later, in 1841, one of America's foremost essayists and
writers, Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote Self Reliance, the now classic
statement of American individualism. He said that:
Whoso would be a man, must be a non-conformist. He who would gather im-
mortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must ex-
plore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of our own
168. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENT (1759); ADAM SMITH, AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
169. See COTTON MATHER, MAGNALIA CHRISTI AMERICANA (1702) (which recounts
the life and times of William Bradford and John Winthrop, the first governors of
Plymouth Bay and Massachusetts colonies).
170. BERCOVITCH, supra note 161, at 108.
171. See BELLAH, supra note 160, at 37.
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mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the
world." 1
72
Summarizing the views of Rousseau and Locke, Emerson wrote,
"[n]o law can be sacred to me but that of my nature.. .the only right
is what is after my constitution, the only wrong is what is againstit.173
In the last few decades of the 19th century, while America endured
the impact of individualism writ largely in the form of the robber
barons of our nascent industrial age, our Supreme Court held that
American business corporations are to be seen and understood as per-
sons.17 4 The famous English poet, William Ernest Henley, captured
the spirit of the age in his poem Echos when he concluded:
It matters not how great the gate.
How charged with punishment the scroll.
I am the master of my fate.
I am the captain of my soul. 17 5
At the turn of the century, American individualism was becoming
imbedded ever deeper in our popular culture. The idea that meaning
in life was a sort of a lonely struggle against the forces of nature and
other dark forces, intent on restraining the individual against his own
true spirit, found popular expression in books like The Call of the
Wild and White Fang by Jack London, the first American writer to
make one million dollars from his writing.176
In sum, the great ideas about the primacy of the individual, articu-
lated by Luther and Calvin, spread from religious spheres to the in-
tellectual circles of Europe. These ideas then crossed the Atlantic
where they found expression in the law and custom of the new
America. Today, they are the dominant spirit of our age. Our mod-
em heroes are Lee Iacocca, who triumphed over a sloppy and lifeless
bureaucracy at Chrysler, and to a lesser extent, Donald Trump, who
emerged in the 1980's as a sort of Master of Manhattan, triumphing
over the apparent chaos known as New York City. Further, the
Rocky and Rambo films, as well as the enduring popularity of Louis
L'Amour novels 177 are evidence that individualism still grips the
172. RALPH W. EMERSON, SELF RELIANCE (1841) (quoted in THE NORTON ANTHOL-
OGY OF AMERICAN LrrERATURE) 891 (2d ed. 1985).
173. 1i
174. See supra notes 130 and 133 and accompanying text.
175. WILLIAM E. HENLY, ECHOES (1988).
176. See COLUMBIA LrrERARY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 540 (Emory Elliott
ed., 1988).
177. It is reported by him that he has sold over 165 million novels (most of which
pit the lone cowboy against the forces of evil), with 85 novels each selling over one
million copies. His work has been translated into 12 languages, and over 390 films and
American imagination. For example, in one of his last bestsellers,
L'Amour summarized over 300 years of thought about American in-
dividualism. His protagonist Joe Mack, an American Indian and one
of America's foremost testpilots, had been lured over Siberia by the
Russians and was shot down. He was without weapons, clothes, and
food while being pursued by the entire Russian Army who tracked
him with its high-tech sensing devices. Mack had to decide to either
fight all of them or to rely on his internal, well-developed natural in-
stincts and face a lone trek of hundreds of miles across Siberia in the
dead of winter. L'Amour concludes:
He must go. To stay was to die. And to stay was to be defeated.... He could
fight them alone (in the woods]. He had always been alone. It was one of the
reasons he had liked flying the aircraft he had flown. He was up there alone,
dependent upon nothing but himself. When he had roamed in the forest as a
boy, he had been alone. When he went away to school, the only Indian, he
had been alone. But he never minded. He was the stronger because of it.1 7 8
Individualism is a multifaceted philosophical, historical, and very
practical notion that is a key to understanding the relationship be-
tween the ideas we have of our social reality and the reality itself.
Individualism is the core concept upon which our politico-legal sys-
tem is founded and is at the root of understanding our popular cul-
ture. Yet, it is so embedded in our collective consciousness that,
according to leading sociologists, it took a foreign observer, Toc-
queville, to identify it. 17 9
While individualism has shaped our view of the world, this system
of shared beliefs that makes possible discourse about the world is be-
coming obsolete. Our modern economic society is dominated by
large, powerful business corporations and governments, not properly
understood through that individualistically shaped lens. American
group reality is now without a belief system or conceptual framework
to comprehend it. Thus, our perceived, individualistically-oriented
capitalist paradigm is an ideology with little reality. The result is a
deep moral frustration based on a misconception of what we think
we know. Noted sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues have
expressed this frustrating impact of individualism:
The extent to which many Americans can understand the workings of our
economic and social organization is limited by the capacity of their chief moral
language to make sense of human interaction. The limit set by individualism
is clear, events that escape the control of individual choice and will cannot
coherently be encompassed in a moral calculation. But that means that much,
if not most, of the workings of the interdependent American political econ-
omy, through which individuals achieve or are assigned their places and rela-
tive power in this society, cannot be understood in terms that make coherent
television movies have been created from his work. Preface to Louis L'Amour, THE
LAST OF THE BREED (1986).
178. Id at 139.
179. BELLAH, supra note 160, at 147.
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moral sense.18 0
To sharpen these generalities, a more pointed consideration of indi-
vidualism and its impact on our civil law will be addressed.
C. Individualism And The Law
It is difficult to be precise about the impact of individualism on the
shape and structure of American law. Individualism defines the
spirit or collective consciousness by which law developed. Legal
scholarship offers minimal disciplined analysis and reflection on the
impact of this consciousness in the development of law.' 8 ' There are
off-hand comments by scholars such as Dean Roscoe Pound, who
wrote that, "[i]f we look narrowly at our legal tradition we shall see
that it has two characteristics. On the one hand, it is characterized
by an extreme individualism.... On the other.., by a tendency to
affix duties and liabilities independently of the will of those
bound .... 182 Arthur Sutherland, quoting Sir William Blackstone in
his inaugural Vinerian Lecture in 1758, stated that, "[t]he only true
and natural foundations of society are the wants and fears of
individuals."l 8 3
Modern legal history classics, such as Lawrence Friedman's A His-
tory of American Law,l84 do not contain an entry under "Individual-
ism" in the index, but do contain several columns of entries under
such topics as "Illinois," "Lawyers," and "Land." This indicates that
legal historians view law not so much as an expression of human self
image, but as a body of principles shaped by economic, political and
historical forces which attach "rights" to roles played by people and
to things in the environment and institutions. 8 5
180. Id at 204 (emphasis added).
181. Of course, there is a huge body of scholarship on parts of our law such as the
Bill of Rights, developed to protect and enhance the individual, but my point refers to
the wider influence of individualism on the way we conceive of the role and structure
of law itself.
182. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 13 (1921).
183. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AND ONE MAN AMONG MANY 3 (1956).
184. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985).
185. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 103 (1977).
One entry under "Individualism" refers to the case of Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass.
220 (1815) as an example of the early impact of individualism on the development of
American law. In this case, the court held that the proprietor of land had entire do-
minion, not only of the soil, but of the space above and below the surface to any extent
he may choose to use or occupy it. Horwitz maintains that this decision is a good ex-
pression of individualism, because the judge refused to examine the social utility of the
actor's conduct and decided in favor of a bold assertion of owners' rights against the
world or any external force.
Given the pervasive influence of individualism at the heart of the
capitalist paradigm, it was reasonable for the United States Supreme
Court in Santa Clara to hold without argument or stated reason that
corporations were persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 8 6 What alternative images were available? The conventional
wisdom, the stock of public images that explained social reality, our
ideology, and our collection of beliefs and extant social science puz-
zles and solutions permitted only one model. We understand, appre-
ciate, and promote that which is the most familiar. We use
metaphors of the familiar to comprehend the unknown. Of course,
corporations like Buffalo Creek or Pittston or Exxon are persons.
That is all we know.
The published scholarship on the impact of the Santa Clara case is
not extensive. Except for a recent piece by Harvard Legal Historian,
Morton Horwitz,187 and a book edited by Warren J. Samuels and Ar-
thur S. Miller, 88 the last major piece on the subject was written
forty years ago by the philosopher John Dewey. 8 9 Dewey opined
that it made little sense to accept the Santa Clara statement as a
legal theory about corporate personality because such theories were
infinitely manipulable. 90 Horwitz makes a similar point and argues
that because the Santa Clara case predated the so-called "natural en-
tity" theory of corporations (which says that corporations are not fic-
tional or artificial entities but are "real" or "natural" people), Santa
Clara cannot be read as an expression of this theory.' 9 ' No where
does he mention that the holding of the case merely formalized in-
choate notions about the significant actors in our society. Thus, it
was natural for the United States Supreme Court to accept and state
that corporations were persons. No perceived alternative metaphors
existed.i9 2
D. Institutionalizing Individualism
The holding of Santa Clara, coupled with the more general view
186. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
187. Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited. The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985).
188. CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY (Warren J. Samuels and Arthur S. Miller eds.,
1987).
189. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
190. Id. at 669-70.
191. Horwitz, supra note 186, at 174.
192. At this point, I wish to acknowledge that it may be an overstatement to say
that business corporations are viewed as persons or individuals for purposes of our law.
This statement leaves unexplored numerous other decisions of courts and legislative
enactments that hold that business corporations may be some other form of being,
such as a partnership. I will not explore these decisions because the thrust of my the-
sis is the damaging aspect of corporations as persons.
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that business corporations are entities which can contract, sue, and be
sued like a person are consciously taught as "sciences" in our colleges
and business schools. Thomas Kuhn's observation about the role of
textbooks in the establishment of a paradigm is very significant in
understanding the public policy of the Buffalo Creek disaster. Kuhn
states that the reliance on textbooks or their equivalents are inevita-
ble concomitants of the emergence of a first paradigm, making them
the single most important source or authority in creating communi-
ties of belief.19s The capitalist paradigm is established largely
through textbooks - the textbooks we use in training for business
and, to a lesser extent, for law.
In this country, about 310,000 students trained in business graduate
each year, including about 67,500 MBA's'94 who rapidly achieve posi-
tions of prominence in our business community. Over the past ten
years, we have graduated about three million students with training
in business.195 One may assume that all of these students took at
least two courses in economics, and one or more courses in business-
related law, whether it be called business law, legal environment or
legal studies. A core concept in economics is the idea of a rational
actor. This is, of course, an idealized version of a reasonably intelli-
gent individual. Moreover, no distinction is made between the ra-
tional corporation and the rational individual. In the guise of a
corporation or an individual, the rational actor has but one objective:
to maximize individual happiness.
In the study of law, formal instruction includes the notion that cor-
porations are to be treated just like individuals. This applies not only
in constitutional doctrines, but in common, garden-variety legal
transactions. In law, a key concept is "reasonable action." No dis-
tinction is made between reasonable corporate action and reasonable
human action.' 96 In teaching economics and law to millions of stu-
dents, some who become our corporate leaders, professors indiscrimi-
nately mix puzzles and solutions involving large business
corporations and natural persons. This is the chief reason corporate
193. KUHN, supra note 152, at 137, 143.
194. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 162
(110th ed. 1990).
195. Id
196. There is, of course, a very real difference. It may have been reasonable for
Pittston and Buffalo Creek to maintain the dangerous dam at Buffalo Creek. It only
cost them $13 million to keep it as it was. It may have cost more to find an alternative
site. As I have suggested, if this same action (keeping a risk-creating dam) was done
by an individual, which resulted in 125 deaths, he or she would probably spend a dec-
ade or more in state prison.
action is seen as individual action. We are taught to see it that way.
We need not teach this way.
It is generally agreed that besides the individual, there are three
institutional power centers in our society: the modern, large business
organization; various governments and organized religion. The point
is that we do not view governments or organized religion as individu-
als. Each institution has its own set of characteristics, idiosyncracies,
and impacts on us and our social system. How we view institutions
external to ourselves is a matter of how we wish to see them. It is a
matter of both vision and belief, or more appropriately, belief and
then vision. It is also a matter of choice. We choose what to believe
and what to see. More importantly, we choose what and how to
teach what we wish to believe.
E. Individualism In Law Masks Human Accountability For Action
Or Inaction In The Name Of A Business Corporation
We have been taught to believe the equivalent of the assertion that
trees are grass or elephants are ants. Although trees may be like
grass (and elephants like ants), in many significant ways they are not
alike. It advances few elements of human understanding and knowl-
edge to believe that large business corporations are human beings.
Our policy "sciences" of economics and law fail miserably when they
confuse the two. There is a categorical difference between the action
and being of a large business corporation like Pittston and individual
human action and being.
In what Pulitzer Prize winner Ernest Becker called "the single
most potentially liberating tract that has ever been fashioned by
man,"19 7 Sigmund Freud (relying on his own intuition and other
sources) concluded that:
Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their
mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact
that they have been transformed into a group puts them in possession of sort
of (a) collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner
quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think,
and act were he in a state of isolation.1 98
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore how society would
be shaped if we had more entrenched paradigms of group behavior.
However, our social reality may be divided into two realms of experi-
ence-that which we experience individually and that which we ex-
perience when in groups of various sorts. We are all both
individualistically and group oriented. We exist sitting at a desk with
our own thoughts (writing a letter, for example), and we exist in a
197. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 132 (1973).
198. SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 73
(1949).
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family, sports club, university, corporation, hospital, or church.
While our policy sciences have not recognized the more group-ori-
ented, social side of our existence because of the pervasive influence
of individualism, they probably will in the future.
Inserted into this picture of a dual reality is the very real notion
that business corporations are understood as people. This public pol-
icy phenomenon muddies any possible clear thinking about the
proper place, function and role of the business corporation in our so-
ciety. The extent of this muddle is illustrated clearly in the Buffalo
Creek disaster: death, destruction, suffering, yet the perpetrator is
allowed to continue just as before the disaster. In 1974, the year of
Pittston's settlement with the Buffalo Creek claimants, the net in-
come of Pittston was $107,446,000,199 up from 1973,200 but short of its
1975 income of $200,146,000.201 It seems Pittston and its management
hardly skipped a step because of the Buffalo Creek settlement. Not
only was there no human accountability, but Pittston did not appear
to suffer in any material way. This result is typical.2 02 The currently
structured capitalist paradigm is substantially flawed. Buried in the
swirl of beliefs, popular puzzles and solutions is a significant concep-
tual error. In fact, corporations are not individual persons. The be-
lief that they are creates a social dynamic that is a cancer on the body
politic and it must be excised. One way to achieve this is to believe
that the corporation is something other than a person. We desper-
ately need a new metaphor.
V. CORPORATIONS AS SHIPS
A. The Use Of Parables And Metaphors In The Formulation Of
Public Policy
In section III I argue that we view remote social events through a
lens, and in section IV I argue that the lens was ground or structured
so not to differentiate between human and corporate action. I also
proposed that the formal educational system helps establish what is
seen through the lens by failing to distinguish between the reality of
199. Digest of Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1975, at 13.
200. Digest of Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1974, at 18.
201. Digest of Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1976, at 20.
202. I am aware of the maneuver by some corporations that have been especially
hard hit by court judgments to escape accounting for their wrongdoing by filing for
bankruptcy. The Manville Corporation (judgments from asbestos-related law suits)
and Texaco (judgment from Penzoil for interfering with contract) obviously felt the
impact of the law. These instances are the exception, not the rule.
corporate and natural person action. There is at least one more facet
to the operation of the internal structure of this lens.
Close to each of us are concrete, physical forms and life exper-
iences used to define and understand more remote or abstract ideas.
Life experiences are often reduced to simple stories which are dis-
cussed, told, and retold as a way of teaching and learning. The dy-
namic, simple stories are called parables. If the experience is more
static, the simple reference to some object is referred to as a meta-
phor. Parables and metaphors are important in understanding how
we view remote social events. Thus, they are very important in un-
derstanding our public policy. Robert Reich, said in a recent book:
The realm of parable and metaphor, the source of our collective vision,
spreads out on the conceptual terrain where public problems are defined and
public ideals forged. To dismiss this realm as "ideological" - meaningless be-
cause irrational and unempirical - is to miss the point that value, not fact is
the currency of the realm.
2 0 3
Reich describes four parables that dominate American thinking on
matters of public policy. One of these parables he labels "The Trium-
phant Individual." This is the story of the "little guy who works
hard, takes risks, believes in himself and eventually earns wealth,
fame and honor .... he's a loner, a maverick, true to himself, plain
speaking, self-reliant, uncompromising in his ideals; he gets the job
done."20 4 Later Reich calls this parable "a myth" that "colors the
prevailing view of how our economy works."20 5
The way Reich recounts this parable illustrates an important point
in at least three dimensions. First, the meaning of the word "individ-
ualism" is seen in a rather concrete form. Second, the parable makes
no distinction between natural persons and business corporations.
The third dimension is most important if our social policy is built on
parables. Arguing that a parable is an inadequate means for compre-
hending our business environment is an incomplete argument unless
a replacement parable is found.
Parables and metaphors perform the same function in the interpre-
tation of our public policy. Metaphor is the use of one thing to un-
derstand and experience another kind of thing.206 Metaphors are
more often used to comprehend a single thing than to comprehend
an event.207 The claims supporting their use are extravagant. One
scholar stated that "[wlhat... will be revealed is that the examination
of metaphor is one of the more fruitful ways of approaching funda-
mental logical, epistemological, and ontological issues central to any
203. ROBERT B. REICH, TALES OF A NEW AMERICA xi (1987).
204. Id, at 9.
205. Id. at 105.
206. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 5 (1980).
207. See, e.g., ON METAPHOR, (Sheldon Sacks ed., 1978); THE LANGUAGE OF IMAGES
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1974).
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philosophical understanding of human experience."208 In a major
new study on the nature of conceptualization and reasoning, linguis-
tics Professor George Lakoff asserts that:
In domains where there is no clearly discernable preconceptual structure to
our experience, we import such structure via metaphor. Metaphor provides us
with a means for comprehending domains of experience that do not have a
preconceptual structure of their own. A great many of our domains of experi-
ence are like this. Comprehending experience via metaphor is one of the
great imaginative triumphs of the human mind.2 0 9
The metaphor of a natural person on which we have built public
policy regarding large American business corporations is, in hind-
sight, a grave conceptual error. A more accurate metaphor is needed.
Large business corporations should be treated as large ships!210
B. Ships Are Better Metaphors For Business Corporations Than
Natural Persons
There are two reasons why ships provide a better metaphor for
business corporations than persons. First, large business corporations
should be viewed as ships for purposes of comprehending their im-
pact on our society. Second, this implication highlights the fact that
natural persons are responsible for the actions of large business cor-
porations and should be accountable for their actions or inactions.
I wish to summarize briefly. In this article I have addressed one
central problem: the problem of human accountability. Accountabil-
ity is a key to legitimacy which is crucial for the survival of any insti-
tution. In a series of lectures at the University of Virginia in 1969,
legal historian James Willard Hurst addressed this problem: "[T]hat
an institution with power must be accountable to some judgment
other than that of the power holders-expresses the prime emphasis
this culture puts on the individual as the ultimate measure of
institutions."2 11
Society acts through many institutions, and the ultimate control of
the institutions comes not from the law, but from individuals. The
Buffalo Creek experience reveals that we have masked human ac-
countability with institutional accountability. In this process, our
chief instrument of capitalism suffers a lack of legitimacy. We can
208. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR (M. Johnson ed., 1982).
209. GEROGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS 303 (1987).
210. The phrase, "The captains of industry," reveals the ship metaphor may already
exist in the public consciousness.
211. JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (1970).
restore this legitimacy by teaching that large business corporations
are to be viewed as ships. Why ships?
Ships are concrete in form and universally recognizable. Both cor-
porations and ships are built by people, but they stand inert and lack
both purpose and meaning without human direction. The large busi-
ness corporation has mass (its assets), and inertia (the force of its
procedure which becomes habit), and is capable of great human dam-
age without proper guidance. The same is true of ships. A ship pro-
duces movement while a corporation produces a product or service.
Both are concrete, physical, and inert, and incapable of movement
without some external, human intervention.
Also, ships are very large structures and can profoundly affect
their environment. They may carry hope and joy or may be a vehicle
of mass destruction.212 Ships can be sued in their own name. A lead-
ing scholar points out that "[t]he ship herself is so far a legal person
that she may be liable, herself, in rem, when her owner is not liable
in personam."213 Ships exist after the death of their owners. The set
of traditions which apply to ships is ancient.
Why is this metaphor necessary? Thomas Kuhn explains that in
the history of science, one paradigm (or metaphor) does not merely
fade into oblivion. Rather the paradigm must be forcefully replaced
with another.214 Similarly, the popular beliefs that serve as the basis
of public policy do not fade away. Beliefs must be challenged, and if
the problem is serious enough, consciously replaced by another more
efficacious popular belief. The belief that corporations are individu-
als must be confronted, exposed and then replaced by the belief that
corporations are ships.
What if we believed corporations were ships-a sort of land-bound
ship, yet capable of leaping oceans to exist wherever it decided. In a
sense, corporations exist wherever there is water for it to locate.215
If a business corporation was a ship, how would we punish the ship
if it caused death and destruction to unsuspecting, innocent people?
What? Punish a ship? How absurd! Some of the assets could be sold
to compensate victims, but, one cannot punish a ship. We should
change the forces, the reasoning that led to the damage. People, not
ships, cause damage. Removing the persons who cause damages is
the most effective method of handling those forces that caused inci-
dents such as the Buffalo Creek disaster. Pittston and Buffalo Min-
212. On April 16, 1947, a ship loaded with fertilizer exploded and burned in the
port area of Texas City, Texas, killing 560 people and injuring thousands. Damage
claims exceeded $200 million. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
213. G.H. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY LAW, 363 (1936).
214. KUHN, supra note 152, at 44.
215. Hence, it is a legal system that recognizes and protects its economic incentives.
Corporate ships float on a sea of legal principles.
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ing as legal structures are not inherently evil. Management, through
its inattention to human life, is the force upon which to focus.
A realistic first step in perpetuating the view that corporations are
ships is to establish it in the classroom. Educators can begin to teach
about the prominence of parables and metaphors in our public life.
They can suggest alternative parables and metaphors. Hence, if a
metaphor makes sense, it will gain acceptance.
However, the argument is not yet complete. How can corporate
management, faced with circumstances similar to the Buffalo Creek
disaster, reach a result analogous to that of the USS Davidson case.
Achieving this task will be addressed in turn.
VI. MANAGEMENT AS TRUSTEES
In the USS Davidson court-martial case, two standards of conduct
exist. The first is stated in Navy Regulations:
The responsibility of the commanding officer for his command is absolute, ex-
cept when, and to the extent, relieved therefrom by competent author-
ity . .while he may, at his discretion, delegate his authority to his
subordinates for the execution of details, such delegation of authority shall in
no way relieve the commanding officer of his responsibility for the safety,
well-being and efficiency of his entire command.2 1 6
This standard was clarified by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1976:
[Tihe Commander's responsibility for his command is absolute and he must
and will be held accountable for its safety, well-being and efficiency. That is
the very foundation of our maritime heritage, the cornerstone of naval effi-
ciency and effectiveness and the key to victory in combat. This is the essence
of the special trust and confidence placed in an officer's patriotism, valor, fi-
delity and abilities. 2 1
7
The second standard is found in the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice. It provides that a commanding officer may be found "in derelic-
tion of duty" for failing to provide adequate medical care.2 18 In
surveying the legal landscape for similar legal notion and duties, I
have found that the law of Trusts is most applicable.
A. Trustees Have A Duty Of Accountability
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts states that "[a] trust is one of
the several judicial devices whereby one person is enabled to deal
216. Naval Reg. 0702.1 (1973).
217. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations to all Flag Officers and Officers
in Command (Oct. 2, 1976) (reprinted in W.P. MACH & A.H. KONETZNI, COMMAND AT
SEA 484-88 (Appendix X) (1982)).
218. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 92.
with property for the benefit of another person."219 More formally, a
trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting
the person by whom the title of the property is held [the trustee] to
equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
create it."220 The position of management in the large American
business corporation can be characterized as a trust relationship.
Management "deals" with property for the benefit of others and it-
self. State-based corporation law could provide the best framework
for the duties discussed. The duties of management under state-
based corporation law have been exhaustively treated.221 What is not
exhaustively treated, however, is the idea that management should
be removed from its position of authority when a death results from
activities related to the corporate purpose. It is this result that should
be achieved.
1. Who Is "Management?"
In defining "management," I adopt the idea used by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Park, the modern classic on the criminal li-
ability of management.222 It held that criminal liability of corporate
management should affix to "those corporate agents vested with the
responsibility, and power commensurate with that responsibility, to
devise whatever measures are necessary" to prevent the illegality in
question.223 Those so positioned have a "responsible share" in the vi-
olation.224 Thus those responsible for managing the enterprise when
it caused damage should be accountable for that damage. In the Buf-
falo Creek case, this group would include: the President of Pittston,
Nicholas Camicia; the President of the Coal Group, Irwin Spotte; and
the on-site agents and operators of Buffalo Mining, Steve Dasovich
and Jack Kent, who had authority to substantially alter the risk
posed by the construction of Dam 3. This definition of "manage-
ment" is equivalent to the concept of "command" used, but not de-
fined, in the public documents relating to the death of Seaman
Smith.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 107 (1959).
220. Id. at § 2
221. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 4 (1969) (providing the best
analysis of this point).
222. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
223. Id. at 672.
224. Id.
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2. What Form Of Accountability Will Management Suffer For A
Breach Of Duty?
It is probable that any single individual held liable for the damages
settled upon in Buffalo Creek could not pay them. In the scheme I
propose, the corporation would be liable for the damage award, but
the responsible persons would be held accountable in the form of dis-
missal from their authority 'positions. Achieving the measure of ac-
countability that puts at risk one's professional life is not
unreasonable in the case of a resulting death. It is the standard ap-
plied in the very large and complex social system of the United
States Navy. Therefore, the principles in the Restatement dealing
with liability of a trustee2 25 for money damages are unimportant.
However, the principles on removal of a trustee are quite relevant.226
B. Removal Of Trustees (Management) For Substantial Breaches
Of Trust
The Restatement of Trusts provides that a trustee may be removed
by a proper court or by one authorized to remove the trustee.227 The
grounds for removal include "the commission of a serious breach of
trust."228 A breach of trust occurs when the trustee violates any duty
owed to the beneficiary.22 9 A trustee owes beneficiaries a duty to
"exercise such care and skill as a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise in dealing with his own property," unless the trustee pro-
cures the appointment as trustee "by representing that he has
greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence" in which case
there is a "duty to exercise such skill."230 These legal principles
could serve as the basis for the removal of management when a
breach of trust occurs.
These suggestions have not violated conventional notions of corpo-
ration law, trust law, or other bodies of law generally applicable to
the issues set forth. It does not, for example, violate conventional no-
tions of law, to suggest that management be treated by the law as
trustees, with the body of the trust being the corporation. Nor does it
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-26, 261-65 (1959).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRuSTS § 16A (1957) states that "[t]he officers and di-
rectors of a corporation, do not hold the title to the property of the corporation and
therefore are not trustees. They are, however, in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation."
227. Id. at § 107.
228. Id. at § 107 cmt. b.
229. Id. at § 201.
230. Id. at § 174.
violate traditional concept of trust law to suggest that the benefi-
ciaries of the trust be thought of in two levels.231
Primary beneficiaries are those who receive substantial direct ben-
efits from the corporate form of enterprise. These are natural per-
sons or groups who are the shareholders, the employees, including
management, the suppliers and creditors, and the consumers of the
corporation's work product.23 2
Secondary beneficiaries are members of the public who live close
to the corporation's activities (for example, the residents of Buffalo
Creek), and who may suffer any adverse consequences of risks im-
posed by the corporation. As representatives of the public, this may
include the local govermnental body, the state government in which
the action of the corporation is manifest, and the federal government.
All of these beneficiaries may seek to impose a measure of account-
ability by removal of management. When death to a beneficiary re-
sults from activities associated with the very reason the corporation
was chartered, then this violates the duty of the trustees (manage-
ment) to exercise care and skill in the operation of the business cor-
poration. Further, ignorance of that particular risk which resulted in
death should not be a defense. The Supreme Court rejected this de-
fense in Park 233 and Dotterweich cases.2 3 4 Further, the U.S. Navy
did not allow lack of knowledge as a defense by the Commanding Of-
ficer of the USS Davidson.
Is this standard too severe? Several Naval officers have stated that
because a commanding officer can be removed for the dereliction of
duty by a lower ranking officer, commanding officers and executive
officers are more prone to hire professionally competent personnel
and to treat all persons on board the ship with respect and dignity.
Thus, this proposed standard may make the entire organization more
sensitive and more humane.
The final segment of this section addresses how and where to
achieve this result. The Restatement provides that a trustee may be
removed by a proper court or by the person so authorized by the
terms of the trust.235 A state court using its equity powers and stan-
231. By first conceptually separating management from the corporation and then
adopting a trustee-beneficiary arrangement to impose duties on management, I avoid
the considerable scholarly literature on whether corporations as collections of natural
persons have a separate moral existence apart from the natural persons. The best
writing on this topic is M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986).
See also, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY (Peter A. French ed., 1972);
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (Peter A. French ed., 1984).
232. A related approach identifying employees, suppliers and customers as "stake-
holders" is presented in R.E. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984).
233. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
234. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1944).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 (1959).
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dards of proof should remove corporate management when a death
results from corporate action or inaction. A board of directors could
impose a similar standard in its corporate by-laws.
What if no one seeks positions of responsibility if severe notions of
accountability are imposed? Will this proposal result in a failure to
undertake some activities because they are too dangerous and too
risky, when loss of one's authority or job is probable? The human
ego will not tolerate this result, but if it does, then sociologist Charles
Perrow concludes that some of activities may indeed be too risky.236
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article I have developed two different, but related notions.
The first is that large business corporations should be seen as ships.
This metaphor should be used in the stories we tell about their oper-
ation and their impact. A metaphor becomes a parable, a parable be-
comes an inextricable part of taught puzzles and solutions, and these
components become the conventional wisdom. Out of this grows our
public knowledge and our public policy. Our public policy is what
we, as a commercial society, do about things. The Buffalo Creek
tragedy is a fair expression of how we handle death and destruction
in the context of our legal system when a large business corporation
is the actor.
Business corporations are treated as natural persons. Our shared
public images of these entities assume them to be persons. They can
sue and be sued; they have constitutional rights; they own property;
and they are held accountable for "their" actions: they may volunta-
rily pay or are ordered to pay compensation for death and destruc-
tion. But this process masks the accountability of those natural
persons who make the large business corporation move.
We must expose the fact that, for purposes of imposing accounta-
bility for death, corporations are not like humans. They are fictional
legal entities that can pay judgments. However, those natural per-
sons ultimately responsible must also be held accountable. This may
be accomplished by teaching, writing, and discussing corporations as
ships. These public discussions will expose the fact that corporations,
like ships, are guided by natural persons.
The second notion, a concomitant of the first, is how to assess the
accountability once management is seen as the human agent that
drives these huge vessels through our midst. We may borrow from
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trust law the idea that in cases of involving death of a beneficiary, we
remove those in management who had a responsible share in the cor-
porate conduct causing the death. Certainly this would include the
president of the corporation and such subordinates with the authority
to deal with the death-causing activity.
And, for what end? What does this achieve? The first notion of
corporations as ships should result in more accurate, efficacious
thought and communication about large business corporations. Based
on this, we would construct a more enlightened public policy. En-
lightened in that it would make us all more humane. At the base of
our religious and moral teachings about life is the dignity and worth
of each natural person. Life, as manifested in and through natural
persons, must be venerated and respected above all else. This re-
spect, dignity, and worth is diminished when life is taken by a fore-
seeable event, and no other natural person answers for this.
The death and destruction at Buffalo Creek is a national tragedy.
The results of it, especially the legal results, exemplify a failure of
human intelligence. Events such as this are preventable. The con-
cept of personal accountability does not deemphasize the chief objec-
tive of our civil law, compensation, so much as it raises the
probability that corporate managers may be more careful if they are
accountable. Being informed, being aware, being careful is what it
means to be a responsible human. And, in some cases, mistakes are
made. To err is also to be human. But, to err by exposing others to
risk and not answering for a death that results from the risk need
not be tolerated.
We can have a more humane business environment. Our law is a
human construct and can change. The courts-martial of the men and
officers of the USS Davidson are unhappy, but enlightening remind-
ers that we can achieve accountability for human-driven destruction
and death.
